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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v. 
LANCE MICHAEL WEEKS, 
Defendant/Petitioner. 
CaseNo.20001049-SC 
Priority No. 13 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT AND OPINION BELOW 
This Court granted Petitioner Lance Michael Weeks' Petition for Writ of Certiorari 
to the Utah Court of Appeals in State v. Weeks. 2000 UT App 273,12 P.3d 110. The Court's 
Order granting the Petition is attached hereto as Addendum A, and the court of appeals1 
decision in Weeks is attached hereto as Addendum B. Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a) and (5) (1996). 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The questions presented for review are as follows: 
1. Assuming arguendo Weeks filed an untimely request for a restitution hearing in 
the trial court, the question is as follows: Once the trial court undertook to conduct a 
restitution hearing, was the trial court obligated to provide a meaningful hearing, where 
Weeks would be entitled to review, challenge and present evidence relating to the matter? 
The court of appeals ruled Weeks was not entitled to such a hearing. State v. Weeks, 2000 
UT App 273. The court of appeals' ruling is in conflict with State v. Starnes. 841 P.2d 712 
(Utah Ct. App. 1992), State v. Johnson. 821 P.2d 1150, 1161 (Utah 1991), and State v. 
Matsamas. 808 P.2d 1048, 1053 (Utah 1991). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: On certiorari, this Court adopts the same standard of 
review used by the court of appeals: questions of law are reviewed for correctness, and 
findings are reversed only if clearly erroneous. State v. Leyva. 951 P.2d 738, 741 (Utah 
1997) (cite omitted). The court of appeals reviewed the issues on appeal in this case for an 
abuse of discretion. "An appellate court will not disturb a trial court's restitution order 'unless 
it exceeds that prescribed by law or otherwise abused its discretion.'" Weeks. 2000 UT App 
273, V (citing State v. Schweitzer. 943 P.2d 649, 653 (Utah Ct. App. 1997)). 
2. Whether the court of appeals properly construed Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (4)(e) 
(Supp. 1998). In considering application of that provision, the court of appeals rejected the 
plain language of the statute and disregarded statutory purpose to find that the statute requires 
a defendant to request a restitution hearing at or before sentencing or waive such hearing. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The second question concerns an issue of statutory 
construction. This Court will review the decision of the court of appeals "for correctness, 
and its conclusions of law are afforded no deference." Esquivel v. Labor Com'n of Utah, 
2000 UT 66,^11, 7 P.3d 777. 
3. Whether the court of appeals1 ruling - that the trial court was not required to make 
certain findings on the record concerning restitution — was in conflict with the plain language 
of Section 76-3-201 (4) and (8\ and State v. Robertson. 932 P.2d 1219,1233-34 (Utah 1997) 
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(the court "shall make" the reasons for restitution "a part of the court record"). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: See the standard of review set forth at question 2, above. 
PRESERVATION OF ARGUMENT 
Weeks' request for a restitution hearing is preserved in the record as follows: In the 
pleadings file for District Court Case No. 99192830 (hereinafter referred to as "Case No. 
2830") at 37; in the pleadings file for District Court Case No. 99193049 (hereinafter referred 
to as "Case No. 3049") at 41; and in the pleadings file for District Court Case No. 99193239 
(hereinafter referred to as "Case No. 3049") at 39. In addition, the matter is preserved in the 
record at 60.* 
RULES. STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The following provisions will be determinative of the questions presented for review: 
1
 In the trial court proceedings relating to this matter, Weeks was convicted in seven 
separate cases. Three case files comprise the record on appeal here, including the pleadings 
file for District Court Case No. 991902830 (hereinafter "Case No. 2830"), the pleadings file 
for District Court Case No. 991903049 (hereinafter "Case No. 3049"), and the pleadings file 
for District Court Case No. 991903239 (hereinafter "Case No. 3239"). The record also 
contains three transcripts designated as 59, 60 and 70. The transcripts relate to all seven 
cases. 
With respect to the pleadings file for CaseNos. 2830,3049, and 3239, the court clerk 
separately numbered the pages in each file beginning with page 1. In that regard, the record 
on appeal contains three separate pages identified as page 1. To avoid confusion in referring 
to documents in the pleadings files, Weeks will identify the pleadings by referring first to 
the trial court case number as indicated above, followed by the page number. For example, 
Weeks will refer to page one of the pleadings in the case ending in "2830" as follows: (Case 
No. 2830:1). With respect to the transcript pages, Weeks will refer to them in the usual 
fashion. For example, the first page of the transcript designated as volume 59 will appear 
as follows: (R. 59:1). 
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Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (Supp. 1998). 
Utah Const, art. I, § 7. 
U.S. Const, amend. XIV. 
The text of those provisions is contained in Addendum C hereto. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, Disposition in the Court Below. 
In February 1999, the state filed charges against Weeks for several offenses in seven 
separate cases. (See Case Nos. 2830:3-4; 3049:3-4; 3239:2-4; see also R. 70:2-3.) 
On July 6, 1999, Weeks entered into a guilty plea before the Honorable J. Dennis 
Frederick in each case. Weeks pleaded guilty to two separate counts of attempted illegal 
possession of a controlled substance, class A misdemeanor offenses (Case No. 2830:19-27; 
R. 70:3); attempted receipt or transfer of a stolen motor vehicle, a third degree felony offense 
(Case No. 3049:24-32); two separate counts of failing to respond to an officer's signal to 
stop, third degree felony offenses (Case No. 3239:22-30; R. 70:2); attempted burglary, athird 
degree felony offense (R. 70:2); and unlawful possession of a controlled substance, a third 
degree felony offense (R. 70:3). 
On September 10,1999, Judge Frederick entered judgment against Weeks, sentencing 
him to a combination of consecutive and concurrent prison terms and ordering him to pay 
$9,104.35 in restitution. (See Case Nos. 2830:33-34; 3049:39-40; 3239:37-38; R. 70:Tab 
2:9-10; and the "Judgment" from the envelope identified as "Documents From Case No. 
991902297.") 
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On September 21,1999, counsel for Weeks requested a restitution hearing in the trial 
court. (Case Nos. 2830:37; 3049:41; 3239:39.) On September 30,1999, the court granted 
the request and scheduled the hearing for October 18, 1999. (Case Nos. 2830:37-39; 
3049:41-43; 3239:39-41.) Thereafter, on October 18 during the hearing, Weeks requested 
an opportunity to review documentation supporting the order of restitution. The judge 
nentertain[ed]n defense counsel's request, reviewed statements in the presentence report, and 
ruled that based on the "evidence" and "arguments," restitution was "fair and reasonable." 
(R. 60:3-7.) Weeks appealed, seeking due process in the proceedings. 
The court of appeals declined to address the issues on appeal on the grounds that 
Weeks waived his right to a restitution hearing. Weeks, 2000 UT App 273. This Court 
ordered review of the matter. (See Addendum A, attached hereto.) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
CASE NO. 2830: According to the charging papers relating to Case No. 2830, on 
January 23, 1999, officers stopped a vehicle driven by Weeks for a registration violation. 
Officers determined to impound the vehicle for the violation and discovered a "container 
with a substance which field tested positive for Methamphetamine." (Case No. 2830:3-4.) 
Weeks was charged with unlawful possession of a controlled substance. (Id.) He pleaded 
guilty to attempted illegal possession of a controlled substance, a class A misdemeanor and 
was sentenced to one year imprisonment. (Case No. 2830:33-34.) 
CASE NO. 3049: According to the charging papers relating to Case No. 3049, on 
December 19, 1998, a vehicle was taken from David Hatton's driveway. The vehicle was 
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unregistered and uninsured. (Case No. 3049:4.) On January 9,1999, officers recovered the 
car. "[T]he car's steering column had been broken and a screw-driver was used to start it." 
(Case No. 3049:4.) Weeks pleaded guilty to attempted receipt or transfer of a stolen vehicle, 
a third degree felony offense (Case No. 3049:24-32), and was sentenced to an indeterminate 
prison term not to exceed five years. (Case No. 3049:39-40.) 
CASE NO. 3239: According to the charging papers relating to Case No. 3239, on 
December 16,1998, Yolanda Garcia drove her car to a store, parked the car and entered the 
store. When she returned to the parking lot, she discovered "that her vehicle had been 
stolen." (Case No. 3239:3.) Later that evening, an officer identified the car, activated his 
lights to pull the car and driver over, and observed the driver accelerate to speeds in excess 
of 70 miles per hour through a residential area. The driver also "failed to stop for four 
different stop signs and made numerous turns. The driver eventually stopped the vehicle, got 
out, and ran away." (Case No. 3239:3.) When the owner retrieved the vehicle, "she located 
items that did not belong to her, including a letter" written to Weeks. (Case No. 3239:3.) 
Weeks was charged with receiving or transferring a stolen motor vehicle and failing to 
respond to an officer's signal to stop. (Case No. 3239:2-3). The state dismissed the first 
charge in exchange for Weeks' guilty plea for failing to respond to an officer's signal to 
stop, a third degree felony offense. The trial judge sentenced Weeks to an indeterminate 
prison term not to exceed five years. (Case No. 3239:37-38.) 
THE RESTITUTION ORDER: On September 10,1999, Judge Frederick sentenced 
Weeks in the above-entitled matters and in four additional cases to indeterminate prison 
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terms, and he ordered that the prison terms be served concurrent to each other and 
consecutive to other matters before Judge Noel. (See_R 70: Tab 2:9-10.) 
Judge Frederick also ordered "that [defendant] pay restitution in the amount of 
$9,104.35, [and] that [defendant] pay a recoupment fee [of $250] for the use of [defendant's] 
publicly provided lawyer.,M Weeks, 2000 UT App 273, T[3; (R. 70: Tab 2:10). Eleven days 
after imposition of restitution, on September 21, 1999, Weeks filed a Motion for Review 
Hearing in each case, objected to the restitution amount, and requested a hearing pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. §76-3-20l(4)(e)(Supp. 1998). (CaseNos. 2830:37; 3049:41; 3239:39.) 
Judge Frederick granted the request for a hearing and scheduled the matter for October 18, 
1999. (Case Nos. 3049:41-43; 2830:37-39; 3239:39-41.) 
At the October 18 hearing, counsel for Weeks argued there was an insufficient 
evidentiary basis for restitution. It was not supported by "evidence in terms of damage." 
Counsel requested a "factual basis" and support for the award "in terms of [] paperwork" 
in order that counsel may assess the accuracy and reliability of the information. (R. 60:4-7.) 
A copy of the transcript for the October 18 hearing is attached as Addendum D. 
In connection with Weeks1 request, the judge stated that in assessing restitution, he 
relied on "the sum of three separate categories identified in the presentence report." 
There were victim impact sums in the amount of $1500 each to one, Hatton 
and one, Garcia for auto damages as a result of thefts of this defendant, and then the 
$6104.35 to Liberty Mutual Insurance carrier, which was the carrier for the Garcia 
vehicle for repairs incident to the conduct of this defendant. 
Now those three sums totaled the $9100 plus dollars that I ordered in the way 
of restitution at the time of the sentencing. 
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(R. 60:4-5; Addendum D hereto.) 
Since statements in the presentence investigation report constituted double hearsay, 
Weeks' counsel again asked for a factual basis to support restitution, including paperwork. 
Counsel argued that the figures in the report were not reliable: "When things are rounded 
off[,] amounts of $1500 bring[] some question in my mind just looking at this." (R. 60:5.) 
The prosecutor opposed the request for documentation, indicated he believed the 
amounts were "probably" appropriate, and argued the award was reasonable. (R. 60:6.) 
Counsel for Weeks again objected to the report as insufficient to support the matter: 
I don't think [] there's a factual basis today in response to defendant's motion suf-
ficient for your Honor to make the finding (inaudible) restitution figures that are there. 
I think the presentence report ought to be helpful, especially to the Court and 
counsel as to what it seeks to prove or document evidence that would support the 
figure, but I don't think it's sufficient as of today for your Honor to actually enter an 
order (inaudible). 
(R. 60:6-7; Addendum D hereto.) 
Thereafter, the trial judge ruled on the matter, stating the following: 
Thank you, Mr. Williams. Given the circumstances, the time of the sentencing, the 
persuasive burden is upon the State to establish, I believe, by [a] preponderance of the 
evidence to myself, the fact finder, that the sums sought for restitution are fair and 
reasonable. Given what I have reviewed, that being the presentence report, as well 
as the orders in the matter, as well as now having heard arguments of counsel, I was 
persuaded and now [am] persuaded that [the] preponderance of the evidence burden 
has been met, that the numbers I have ordered as restitution [are] fair and reasonable. 
Consequently the motion to modify the — I will characterize it as a motion to modify 
the order of restitution is denied. 
(R. 60:7; Addendum D hereto); Weeks, 2000 UT App 273, ^ 5. Judge Frederick then entered 
the following order regarding the matter: 
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This matter came up for hearing regarding defendant's Motion Objection to the Order 
of Restitution in this case on the 18th day of October, 1999, the defendant being 
present and represented by his counsel, and the state being present and represented by 
its counsel. The Court having heard evidence and arguments of counsel, and being 
otherwise fully advised in the premises hereby finds by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the original order in the Judgment and Commitment in this case is the 
proper amount to be ordered as restitution and hereby affirms that order and denies 
defendant's motion. 
(Case Nos. 2830:42; 3049:45; 2393:43.) A copy of each order is attached as Addendum E. 
Weeks appealed from the final order of restitution.2 He argued that he was denied a 
"full hearing" and due process in the proceedings. See Weeks, 2000 UT App 273, 16. 
In response to Weeks' arguments, the state argued for the first time on appeal that 
Weeks' request for the restitution hearing was untimely and should be deemed waived. A 
majority of the court of appeals agreed with the state and refused to reach the merits of 
Weeks' claims on appeal. Id. at H 10-12. 
Weeks maintains that the court of appeals erred. Inasmuch as the trial court addressed 
the merits of Weeks' claims on October 18, the issues were properly preserved. Weeks is 
entitled to review of the merits on appeal. He respectfully requests that this Court reverse 
2
 See Stames, 841 P.2d at 714-15 (defendant appealed from order entered in connection 
with restitution hearings); State v. Dominguez. 1999 UT App 343, 15, 992 P.2d 995 
(defendant appealed from order entered in connection with restitution hearing); 
see also ProMax Dev. Corp. v. Raile. 2000 UT 4,1110-16, 998 P.2d 254 (notice of appeal 
timely filed within 30 days of final determination regarding attorneys' fees); Sittner v. 
Schrieven 2000 UT 45,1118-23 ,2 P.3d 442 (judgment was not final until issues regarding 
attorneys' fees were finally resolved): see also State v. DepaolL 835 P.2d 162,163-64 (Utah 
1992) (considering Oregon law in interpreting Utah restitution statute); State v. Bonner, 771 
P.2d 272,273 (Or. 1989) (since restitution is part of the sentence, an order/judgment is not 
final for purposes of appeal until restitution issues are resolved); Utah Code Ann. 76-3-
201(4)(a)(i) (Supp. 1998) (restitution is part of sentencing). 
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the court of appeals1 ruling, vacate the trial court's order of restitution, and remand the case 
to the trial court for a full hearing on the restitution issues as further set forth below. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
When a trial judge has considered the merits of an issue and ruled on the matter, the 
issue is deemed properly preserved for purposes of appeal. See Johnson. 821 P.2d at 1161; 
State v. Beason, 2000 UT App 109, 1flfl4-l5, 2 P.3d 459. In Weeks1 case, the trial judge 
considered the merits of Weeks' request for a "full hearing" on restitution, then denied the 
request on the basis that the restitution award was fair and reasonable. Weeks appealed. The 
court of appeals refused to address the merits of the matter on the basis of waiver. 
The court of appeals1 ruling is in error. The court of appeals should have considered 
Weeks1 arguments on appeal and found that the trial court failed to ensure due process and 
a full hearing on the restitution issues in this case. On that basis, this Court should reverse 
the court of appeals1 ruling, vacate the trial court's restitution order, and remand the case for 
a full hearing on restitution. 
Next, the court of appeals has interpreted Section 76-3-201(4)(e) to provide that if a 
defendant fails to object to the imposition of or amount in restitution "at or before 
sentencing," he has waived his right to a "full hearing." That interpretation is not in harmony 
with the plain language or purpose of the statute. Since the provision at issue serves to 
ensure due process in sentencing, Weeks maintains that this Court should construe § 76-3-
201(4)(e) in a manner consistent with other sentencing provisions. To that end, the 
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timeliness requirement set forth at subsection (4)(e) should be construed to provide that the 
trial court is required to provide a full hearing on the issue of restitution without undue delay 
where defendant has made a request within a reasonable time. The timeliness requirement 
should be construed as directory, not mandatory, to ensure due process. 
Finally, the court of appeals erred in ruling that a trial court is not required to identify 
on the record the reasons for ordering restitution in light of mandatory statutory factors. 
Also, the court of appeals was incorrect in ruling that the trial court in this case complied 
with the statute when it ordered restitution. In that regard, this Court should reverse the 
court of appeals1 ruling and remand the case to the trial court for compliance with the statute. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. ASSUMING ARGUENDO WEEKS FAILED TO TIMELY 
REQUEST THE RESTITUTION HEARING, ONCE THE TRIAL COURT 
UNDERTOOK TO PROVIDE THE HEARING. IT WAS OBLIGATED TO 
ENSURE DUE PROCESS IN THE PROCEEDINGS. 
A. A DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO DUE PROCESS AT SENTENCING. 
Restitution may be imposed as part of sentencing. 
A court may sentence a defendant to a prison term, impose a fine, enter 
judgment for a lower category of offense pursuant to § 76-3-402, place him on 
probation, disqualify him from public or private office pursuant to § 76-3-201, 
sentence the defendant to serve prison terms concurrently or consecutively, order the 
defendant to pay restitution, or suspend a prison sentence. 
State v. Lipskv. 608 P.2d 1241,1244 (Utah 1980). According to Utah law, if restitution is 
ordered and Mthe defendant objects to the imposition, amount, or distribution of the 
restitution, the court shall at the time of sentencing allow the defendant a full hearing on the 
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issue." Utah Code Ann. §76-3-20l(4)(e) (Supp. 1998). 
The court of appeals has interpreted the "full hearing" provision set forth at § 76-3-
201 (4)(e) to ensure due process, where a defendant is entitled to review and present evidence 
relating to restitution and to cross-examine the other side's witnesses. See Stames, 841 P.2d 
at 715-16. In considering the provision, the court of appeals has stated the following: 
Under both the United States and the Utah State Constitutions, due process requires 
criminal proceedings including sentencing to be based upon accurate and reasonably 
reliable information. See State v. Gomez. 887 P.2d 853, 854 (Utah 1994). Thus, 
" [fundamental principles of procedural fairness in sentencing require that a defendant 
have the right to examine and challenge the accuracy and reliability of the factual 
information upon which his sentence is based." Id. at 855. 
Weeks. 2000 UT App 273, ^[8; see also State v. Patience. 944 P.2d 381, 389 (Utah Ct. App. 
1997); Utah Const, art. I, § 7; U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1. 
This Court likewise has recognized that a defendant is entitled to due process in 
sentencing. "The due process clause in both the United States and Utah Constitutions 
'requires that a sentencing judge act on reasonably reliable and relevant information in 
exercising discretion in fixing a sentence.5" State v. Johnson. 856 P.2d 1064, 1071 (Utah 
1993) (cites omitted) (double hearsay statements in sentencing report may not serve as a 
basis for imposing a sentence against defendant); State v. Howell. 707 P.2d 115,118 (Utah 
1985) (constitution requires judge to act on reliable, relevant information in sentencing); 
Lipsky. 608 P.2d at 1248-49; State v. Casarez. 656 P.2d 1005, 1007 (Utah 1982). 
In this matter, the trial judge imposed restitution against Weeks in the amount of 
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$9,104.35. Weeks objected to the order and requested a foil hearing on the matter, including 
an opportunity to review and cross-examine the evidentiary basis for the award. Weeks 
argued that the statements set forth in the presentence investigation report were insufficient 
to support the amount and he was entitled to review supporting documentation on the matter. 
(CaseNos. 2830:37; 3049:41; 3239:39; R. 60). 
The trial court considered Weeks1 arguments then denied his request to review 
supporting evidence on the basis that restitution was fair and reasonable. (R. 60:5-7.) Weeks 
appealed. He argued the trial court committed error when it refused to allow him to examine 
and challenge the accuracy and reliability of evidence relating to the restitution amounts. 
See Weeks, 2000 UT App 273, ^ 6. 
The court of appeals refused to consider the merits of Weeks1 claims and found 
waiver. Id. at*|H[9-12. The court of appeals1 ruling is in error. See infra Point I.B., below. 
Assuming arguendo Weeks made an untimely request for a restitution hearing, the 
trial court nevertheless granted the request, then held a hearing where it considered counsels1 
arguments before ruling on the merits of the matter. (R. 60.) Since the trial court proceeded 
with the matter on the merits, it was improper for the court of appeals to find waiver. See 
infra Point I.C., below. The court of appeals should have considered the merits and reversed 
the case as a result of the statutory and due process violations. 
B. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS RULING IN THIS MATTER. IT 
FAILED TO PROVIDE DUE PROCESS AND A FULL HEARING. 
This case is similar to Starnes, 841 P.2d 712. In that matter, defendant pleaded guilty 
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to charges of criminal mischief and assault, and the victim requested restitution. Thereafter, 
a restitution hearing was scheduled, which the defendant failed to attend for lack of notice. 
Id. at 713. The trial judge entered restitution against defendant in the amount of $281.89. 
When Defendant Starnes failed to make restitution payments on the judgment, the trial 
judge entered an order to show cause against him and held a hearing. During that 
proceeding, defendant asked the court to set aside the judgment and to provide a foil hearing 
on the restitution award. Id In response to defendant's request, the trial court held two 
additional hearings (a hearing was held on November 13, 1991 and a hearing was held on 
January 8, 1992), where defendant was able to engage in a limited and flustered cross-
examination of the victim with respect to the alleged damages suffered, and then to proffer 
evidence from his own witnesses. Starnes. 841 P.2d at 713-14. The judge specifically 
refused to permit defendant's witnesses to testify. Id. at 714. 
After the hearings, the judge increased the amount in restitution to $450. Defendant 
appealed and argued "the trial court denied him his statutory right to a foil hearing." Id. at 
714. In response, the state claimed defendant waived the issues in the lower court by failing 
to "challenge the trial court's erroneous ruling below." Id. at 716. The court of appeals 
rejected the state's waiver claim and found the issues preserved for appeal. f"A matter is 
sufficiently raised if it is submitted to the trial court, and the court is afforded an opportunity 
to rule on the issue.1" Id at 716 (citing State v. One 1979 Pontiac Trans Am. 771 P.2d 682, 
684 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)). 
The court of appeals then addressed the matter of the foil hearing and found that the 
14 
trial court violated the statute. Specifically, the court of appeals determined that to constitute 
a full hearing, not only was the trial court required to provide defendant with the opportunity 
to review and cross-examine the evidence allegedly supporting the amount in damages, but 
also, defendant must be able to present his evidence at the hearing. Starnes, 841 P.2d at 715; 
see also. State v. Chambers. 709 P.2d 339, 340-42 (Utah 1985) (state's evidence failed to 
support restitution amount ordered by court). The court stated, "Even when the third and 
fourth hearings are combined, however, it is evident that Starnes was not afforded a 'full 
hearing.' The trial court refused to 'hear' Starnes's evidence that there was no actual damage. 
Therefore, while Starnes was allowed to appear in court, he was denied an opportunity to 
present his evidence." Starnes. 841 P.2d at 715. The court of appeals remanded the case for 
a proper hearing. Id. at 716. 
Pursuant to Starnes, once the trial court in Weeks1 case determined to consider the 
merits of Weeks' requests and objections, Weeks was entitled to due process in the matter. 
Instead, the trial court proceeded with the matter in violation of the statute and Weeks' due 
process rights. 
Specifically, in ordering restitution here, the trial court relied only on statements set 
forth in the presentence investigation report to assess the amount. (R. 60:4-5.) The report 
reflected that David Hatton's car was stolen from his home. It was uninsured. When it was 
returned, the radio was damaged and the car was scratched and dented. Also, Hatton was 
missing items of personal property that were not described even generally in the report. The 
report totaled damages at $1500. It is not clear from the report whether the amount was 
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based on an estimate, replacement value, cost of repairs or a haphazard guess. 
(See "Presentence Investigation Addendum" at 8.) 
The report also reflected that Yolanda Garcia's car was stolen. When it was returned, 
it required repairs. Garcia claimed to be missing personal items that were not described, but 
valued at $500 and she paid $500 on an insurance deductible plus an additional $500 for 
repairs. The report stated that Garciafs insurance company paid $6104.35 toward repairs on 
the car. (See "Presentence Investigation Addendum" at 9.) 
During the October 18 hearing, Weeks questioned the reliability of the statements 
contained in the report, where the statements apparently came from the report author (C.B. 
Stirling), who in turn summarized information either from the victims, an insurance agent, 
or other third-party witnesses. (See "Presentence Investigation Addendum" at 13.) Weeks 
argued the report alone could not serve as the basis for assessing restitution. (R. 60:5-7.) 
Indeed, the statements were double-hearsay. With respect to such statements, this 
Court has ruled as follows: 
For example, the ISAT report, which is itself hearsay, summarizes the 
statements made by the niece during the interviews. The report then relates a 
summary of the mother's description to the ISAT interviewer of statements made by 
the niece. Although hearsay evidence can be admissible in a sentencing proceeding, 
double hearsay is so inherently unreliable and presents such a high probability for 
inaccuracy that it cannot stand alone as the basis for sentencing. 
Johnson, 856 P.2d at 1071: see also Chambers. 709 P.2d at 340-42 (evidence insufficient to 
support restitution amount). 
Notwithstanding the unreliability of the report, the trial judge in Weeks' case 
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considered it to be sufficient. The trial judge flentertain[ed]fl Weeks1 arguments then denied 
his request to review documentation allegedly supporting the amount in restitution. (R. 60:7.) 
The trial judge ruled that n[g]iven the circumstances" and the state's burden of proof, and 
based on the statements set forth in the "presentence report," and the "arguments of counsel," 
the restitution order was "fair and reasonable." (R. 60:7.) 
The trial court's ruling was in error. The trial court was required to ensure due 
process. Starnes, 842 P.2d at 715-16; Gomez, 887 P.2d at 854-55; Johnson, 856 P.2d at 1071. 
Weeks should have been provided with the opportunity to review and cross-examine 
evidence relating to the restitution amount. See Starnes, 842 P.2d at 715-16; Johnson, 856 
P.2datl071. 
Since the trial court failed to provide a full hearing or due process in the matter, its 
ruling constituted an abuse of discretion and violated Weeks' constitutional and statutory 
rights. See Starnes, 842 P.2d at 715-16: State v. Cobb, 774 P.2d 1123, 1129 (Utah 1989) 
(judge's discretion in sentencing lies within limits prescribed by law); State v. Kelly, 784 
P.2d 144, 146 (Utah 1989) (discretion is within statutory limits); State v. Jolivet, 712 P.2d 
843, 844 (Utah 1986) (discretion in sentencing is limited by law). The court of appeals 
should have reversed the restitution order and remanded the case for a full hearing on the 
matter. It failed to do so. That was error. 
C. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RELYING ON WAIVER AS A BASIS 
FOR AFFIRMING THE MATTER. 
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If a trial court considers the merits of an untimely request or objection, the objection 
is deemed to be properly preserved for purposes of appeal, as set forth in State v. Johnson, 
821 P.2dat 1161. 
In that case, defendant failed to raise the corpus delicti rule in a timely manner during 
trial. He raised the issue for the first time in a motion for a new trial. LI While such conduct 
generally would constitute waiver for purposes of the appeal, see Utah R. Evid. 103(a)(1), 
this Court ruled that "in disposing of the new trial motion, the trial court did not rely on 
waiver, but addressed the merits of the issue." Johnson, 821 P.2d at 1161. Thus, 
notwithstanding the untimely filing, the matter was properly preserved and the merits would 
be addressed on appeal. Id.; see also Matsamas, 808 P.2d at 1053 (trial court considered 
defendant's untimely objection, thereby preserving issue for appeal); State v. Seale, 853 P.2d 
862, 870 (Utah 1993), cert denied, 510 U.S. 865 (1993): see also State v. Parker. 872 P.2d 
1041, 1043-44 (Utah Ct. App.) (trial court acted on merits of untimely motion, thereby 
preserving issue for appeal), cert, denied. 883 P.2d 1359 (Utah 1994). 
Johnson applies here. Assuming arguendo Weeks made an untimely objection to 
restitution, the trial juge permitted a hearing on the matter and entertained Weeks1 arguments. 
(R. 60.) In disposing of Weeks' objections, the trial court "did not rely on waiver, but 
addressed the merits of the issues"; the trial court ruled that the restitution amount based only 
in statements set forth in a presentence investigation report was fair and reasonable. (R. 
60:7.) Although the trial court erred in its ruling and failed to provide a "full hearing" as 
required by the statute, see Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(4)(e) (if defendant objects to 
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restitution, trial court shall allow full hearing) and Point LB., above, the ruling was sufficient 
for the court of appeals to find that the issues were properly preserved for appeal. 
The court of appeals nevertheless ruled that Weeks waived the full hearing with an 
untimely objection. In finding waiver, the court of appeals stated the following: 
fl{10] [B]ecause defendant did not request a full restitution hearing at or before 
sentencing and had no good cause not to make the request, he waived his entitlement 
to a restitution hearing. See Utah R. Crim. P. 12(d). [] 
^[11. Defendant argues that the trial court, in effect, waived his waiver because he 
asserts the hearing on his motion after sentencing amounted to a restitution hearing. 
In support of his position defendant cites to the following cases: State v. Seale. 853 
P.2d 862, 870 (Utah 1993) (concluding when issue raised in motion for new trial for 
first time, and court addressed issue on merits in denying motion and considered 
alleged error rather than finding it waived, defendant's right to assert issue on appeal 
was resuscitated); State v. Belgard, 830 P.2d 264, 266 (Utah 1992) (holding when 
defendant waived objection to introduction of evidence but evidentiary hearing 
granted and judge considered claim, defendant's waiver was effectively waived by 
judge); State v. Johnson. 821 P.2d 1150, 1161 (Utah 1991) (concluding when trial 
court addressed issue fully and did not rely on waiver, issue will be considered on 
appeal); State v. Matsamas. 808 P.2d 1048, 1053 (Utah 1991) (same); State v. 
Dominguez, 1999 UT App 343, ^[5, 992 P.2d 995 (holding defendant may appeal 
order stemming from full restitution hearing, even though motion for hearing filed ten 
days after sentencing); State v. Parker, 872 P.2d 1041, 1044 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) 
(holding "trial court acted on the merits of motion and thus de facto considered it 
timely"). 
[^12. However, these cases are all distinguishable from this case. In this case, "[t]he 
trial court did not take evidence or hold an evidentiary hearing on the issue, but 
instead simply denied the Motion to Alter or Amend," and, thereby, did not waive 
defendant's earlier waiver of the hearing. Estate of Covington v. Josephson. 888 P.2d 
675, 678 n.5 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). Here, notwithstanding the trial court's mischar-
acterization of the hearing in its order, the court did not hold an evidentiary hearing 
on the restitution amount, or reconsider the restitution amount. Instead, the court 
merely clarified that the restitution amount ordered was based upon the presentence 
report. No further inquiry into the restitution amount was made, no evidence was 
taken, and the court did not address the issue on the merits.[] Thus, because the court 
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did not conduct an evidentiary hearing or even reconsider the restitution amount on 
the merits, there was no resuscitation of defendant's earlier waiver. [] 
Weeks, 2000 UT 273. The court of appeals1 reliance on Estate of Covington v. Josephson, 
888 P.2d 675 (Utah Ct.App. 1994), c e ^ denied 910 P.2d 425 (Utah 1995), and Rule 12(d), 
Utah Rules ofCriminal Procedure, is misplaced. Weeks, 2000 UTApp 273, ^ 10,12. That 
authority is distinguishable and does not support the court of appeals' ruling here. 
In Covington, after parties to a contract dispute filed cross motions for summary 
judgment, the trial court ruled in favor of plaintiffs. Covington, 888 P.2d at 676-77. 
Defendants subsequently filed a post-summary-judgment motion to alter or amend, which 
the trial court "simply denied.1' Id. at 678 and n. 5. On appeal, defendants asked the court 
of appeals to consider the merits of the post-summary-judgment motion. It refused to do so 
and ruled thatff [r]aising an issue in a post-trial motion - or as in the case here, post-summary 
judgment - does not preserve that issue for appeal." Id. at 678. 
The doctrine identified by the court of appeals in Covington - that an issue raised 
"post-trial" or "post-summary-judgment" is not properly preserved for purposes of appeal — 
serves to ensure that parties involved in trial or summary judgment proceedings are bound 
by arguments and evidence they deem necessary to the issues. If trial courts permitted 
parties to reopen trials and summary judgment motions because counsel failed to raise an 
objection during the proceedings, that may improperly permit successive attempts at re-
litigating matters. 
Covington is inapplicable to Weeks' case for several reasons. First, when a defendant 
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requests a restitution hearing, the request necessarily must be made during "post-trial" 
proceedings. Pursuant to Utah law, restitution is determined by the trial judge after a jury 
has rendered a verdict or defendant has entered a guilty plea. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-
201(4)(a) (Supp. 1998) (after conviction court will determine whether restitution is 
appropriate as part of sentencing). In the context of this case, where the objection relates to 
a post-trial sentencing matter, the doctrine articulated in Covington is inapplicable. See also 
Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e) (2001) (court may correct an illegal sentence at any time). 
Second, a defendant who makes a request for a restitution hearing, timely or not, is 
not seeking to reopen resolved issues since the order of restitution has not been tested. 
Indeed, the only opportunity to test whether restitution is based in accurate and reliable 
information is at the restitution hearing after the trial judge has imposed restitution as part 
of sentencing. The restitution hearing accommodates due process; it is in the parties1 
interests to have restitution based on reliable, accurate information. 
Third, the trial court in Covington did not set a hearing on the motion to alter or 
amend judgment, and did not consider argument on the matter or the evidence of record in 
denying defendants' request. Rather, the trial court in Covington "simply denied the Motion 
to Alter or Amend." Covington, 888 P.2d at 678 n.5. In that regard, the trial court's ruling 
in Covington was a determination de facto that defendants waived the matter for purposes 
of appeal. See State v. Beason. 2000 UT App 109, ^[14,2 P.3d 459 (recognizing that under 
Covington, party's post-summary-judgment motion was not preserved for appeal where trial 
court "simply denied the motion without taking evidence or holding a hearing"). 
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In Weeks' case, after he made a request for the restitution hearing, the trial judge 
granted the request for a hearing and set it for October 18. (See Case No. 3049:42-43; Case 
No. 2830:38-39; 3239:40-41.) On that date, the trial judge held a hearing and considered the 
presentence investigation report and arguments of counsel before ruling that restitution was 
Mfair and reasonable." (R. 60.) Thus, unlike the trial judge in Covington, the trial judge here 
specifically considered the merits of Weeks' requests and objections before ruling on the 
matter. "Because the trial court addressed the alleged error rather than finding it waived, the 
court granted defendant relief from his waiver and defendant's right to assert the issue on 
appeal was preserved." Beason,2000UTApp 109,1fl5 (citing Bdgard, 830 P.2d at 265-66). 
With respect to Rule 12(d), Utah R. Crim. P., it provides the following: "Failure of 
the defendant to timely raise defenses or objections or to make requests which must be made 
prior to trial or at the time set by the court shall constitute waiver thereof, but the court for 
cause shown may grant relief from such waiver." The court of appeals relied on that 
provision in Weeks to find that "because defendant did not request a full restitution hearing 
at or before sentencing and had no good cause not to make the request, he waived his 
entitlement to a restitution hearing." Weeks. 2000 UT App 273, ^|10.3 
Rule 12(d) does not apply to this matter for three reasons: First, Weeks was not 
required to make a defense or objection concerning restitution "prior to trial"; second, the 
trial court did not "set" a time for making the objection; and third, the trial court did not rely 
3
 The court of appeals apparently imposed a "good cause" standard to Rule 12(d), where 
no such standard is mentioned in the rule. 
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on waiver in ruling on the matter. See (R. 60); Beason, 2000 UT App 109,1114-15. 
Indeed, once the trial court here determined to provide a hearing to "entertain" 
counsel's comments (R. 60:3) and to rule on the merits, any timeliness requirement was 
deemed waived and the issues were properly preserved for purposes of appeal. Beason, 2000 
UT App 109, H14-15. The trial court's actions were subject to review. 
Contrary to the court of appeals' ruling, Weeks, 2000 UT App 273, H10-12, this case 
should not have been affirmed on waiver grounds. The court of appeals had sufficient basis 
to consider the issues on appeal and to find that the trial court violated Weeks' due process 
and statutory rights. Weeks respectfully requests that this Court reverse the court of appeals' 
ruling, vacate the trial court's restitution order, and remand the case to the trial court for a full 
hearing on the restitution issues. 
POINT II. THE COURT OF APPEALS INTERPRETATION OF § 76-3-201 
IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE STATUTE OR 
STATUTORY PURPOSE. 
According to the court of appeals, § 76-3-20 l(4)(e) provides that "any request for a 
full restitution hearing must be made at or before sentencing." Weeks, 2000 UT App 273, 
^|9. Also, if defendant fails to make such a request at sentencing he has waived his 
entitlement to a restitution hearing. Id. at^jlO. 
Contrary to the court of appeals' interpretation, subsection (4)(e) is silent as to when 
defendant must object to restitution. Furthermore, it does not suggest that failure to object 
at sentencing constitutes waiver. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20 l(4)(e) (Supp. 1998). 
Specifically, the statute provides that if defendant objects to restitution, "the court 
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shall at the time of sentencing allow the defendant a full hearing on the issue." Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-3-20l(4)(e). The phrase "at the time of sentencing" relates to the trial court's 
obligations, where strict adherence to § 76-3-20l(4)(e) would require the court to allow a 
"full hearing" at sentencing if defendant objected to the amount in restitution imposed. 
In considering application of the statute as interpreted by the court of appeals, if a 
defendant requested a full restitution hearing "before sentencing" (Weeks, 2000 UT App 273, 
[^9), the request would be improper and premature. According to Utah statutory law, parties 
are notified of "recommended" restitution amounts only three days before sentencing. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(5)(b)(ii) and (6)(a) (1999). Thereafter, on the day of sentencing, 
defendant is informed for the first time whether the trial court intends to impose restitution 
against him and in what amount. (See R. 70:Tab 2:10 (trial judge ordered restitution at 
sentencing).) In some instances, defendant will not have an objection to the amount in 
restitution imposed. Thus, there will be no need for a full hearing. In other instances, 
defendant may be able to engage in informal discovery with the prosecutor in order to 
alleviate concerns about the amount and to confirm the evidentiary basis for the award. If 
the defendant's concerns are resolved through informal discovery, he likely will not request 
a full hearing on the matter. 
Practically speaking, a defendant will not have an objection to the imposition or 
amount of restitution until after sentencing, when restitution either has or has not been 
imposed in an objectionable or unobjectionable amount. It would be improper and premature 
for defendant to object to the amount of restitution "before sentencing" as ordered by the 
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court of appeals. See Weeks, 2000 UT App 273, TJ9. Thus, a proper objection to restitution 
must necessarily be made after restitution is imposed. 
If defendant makes an objection after restitution is imposed, according to the statute 
the trial court must allow the full hearing "at the time of sentencing." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-
201(4)(e). Since restitution generally is imposed at the time of sentencing, strict adherence 
to that provision would create a hardship. That is, strict adherence would require parties to 
subpoena witnesses, collect evidence, and prepare arguments on short notice (court and 
parties are notified of recommended restitution three days before sentencing (§ 77-18-
l(6)(a))), on the possibility that defendant may object to restitution at sentencing. 
Strict adherence either would require the trial court to accommodate an evidentiary 
hearing on a crowded calendar without advanced notice (an objection to restitution imposed 
at sentencing would require a full hearing at that time); or it would require trial courts to 
anticipate a full hearing at every sentencing on the possibility that restitution may be imposed 
and defendant may object. To accommodate the immediacy of the matter, third-party 
witnesses also would have to attend every sentencing on the chance they may be called to 
testify to defend or refute the restitution award. 
In addition to being a hardship, strict adherence would fail to accommodate due 
process. The immediacy of the matter (three days from the date parties are notified of the 
recommended amounts to sentencing (§ 77-18-l(6)(a))), would not accommodate the 
exchange, let alone the review, of evidentiary materials or documents prior to the hearing, 
and it would not permit either the state or defense to consider, let alone prepare, 
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examinations or arguments to defend or dispute the amount in restitution ordered at 
sentencing. See Monson v. Carver. 928 P.2d 1017,1028 n.9 (Utah 1996) (restitution hearing 
would be held after appropriate notice to defendant and after defendant had access to 
materials); see also Dominguez, 1999 UT App 343, 1fl|3,5 (sentencing hearing was held in 
April 1998, objection to restitution was filed on or about May 14, 1998, and restitution 
hearing was in September 1998). 
In considering the timeliness requirements and application of § 76-3-20 l(4)(e) in 
Weeks1 case, Judge Billings stated the following in her dissent: 
The policy behind the timeliness requirement [in the statute] is less significant when, 
as here, an objection necessitates a separate evidentiary hearing. 1 
1 The state concedes that, had Defendant presented his objection requesting an 
evidentiary hearing at his original sentencing hearing, the restitution hearing 
could not have taken place immediately because witnesses would have to have 
been subpoenaed, evidence gathered, and arguments prepared. 
Inasmuch as no objection could be raised until after imposition of restitution, I see no 
practical difference between an objection raised at the sentencing hearing and an 
objection raised eleven days later — well before the time for a direct appeal has run. 
Weeks. 2000 UT App 273, ^ 22 (Billings, J., dissent) (emphasis in original). 
Since strict adherence to § 76-3-20 l(4)(e) would fail to serve due process concerns 
and would create a hardship on parties, trial courts, and third-party witnesses, Weeks 
maintains the provision should be interpreted in light of its due process concerns and purpose 
to provide fairness in sentencing, like other sentencing statutes. 
In State v. Helm. 563 P.2d 794 (Utah 1977), this Court interpreted Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-35-1 (1953 as amended), which provided that after a guilty verdict, "the court must 
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appoint a time for pronouncing judgment, which must be at least two days and not more than 
ten days after the verdict." Id. at 797 (emphasis added). The defendant in Helm argued that 
the trial court's failure to pronounce sentence within the time mandated by statute deprived 
the trial court of jurisdiction over the matter. Id. at 797. This Court disagreed and construed 
the statute as follows: 
[This] statute should be viewed in harmony with the general rule of statutory 
construction: that it should be interpreted and applied in light of its purpose. That 
purpose was that there should be no undue or unreasonable delay in the 
pronouncement of the sentence, particularly that there should be no imposition of 
hardship on the defendant or prejudicial effect upon his rights. Consistent with what 
has been said, we think the view which is sound and which comports with the 
requirements of justice is that the limits so prescribed in the statute are not mandatory 
and jurisdictional, but are directory; and that where the sentence is imposed within a 
reasonable time so that there is no abuse of the court's power nor adverse effects upon 
the defendant, he should not be entitled to go free, but should be entitled to have the 
correct sentence imposed upon him, with due consideration given to any time he may 
have served because of the delay. 
14 at 797 (footnote omitted). 
In State v. Tvree. 2000 UT App 350, 17 P.3d 587, the court of appeals likewise 
considered a sentencing provision. It construed Rule 22(a), Utah R. Crim. P., which 
provides that the trial court "shall set a time for imposing sentence which shall be not less 
than two nor more than 45 days after the verdict or plea, unless the court, with the 
concurrence of the defendant, otherwise orders.11 Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a). Notwithstanding 
the language of the provision, the court of appeals ruled the statute was directory in effect, 
not mandatory. Tyree, 2000 UT App 350, [^15. The court of appeals also stated the 
following: 
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[The rule] directs the actions of trial courts in a context involving multiple actors — 
the court, the prosecutor, defense counsel, defendant, and AP&P. Whereas parties 
have only their own interests to further, courts are charged with balancing the needs 
of multiple actors and furthering the interests of justice. Courts, therefore, should not 
be held to the same strictures as individual parties in such situations. 
Id. at T|10; see Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e) (an illegal sentence may be corrected at any time). 
Since § 76-3-20 l(4)(e) likewise directs the actions of the trial court in sentencing, it 
should be construed to provide that when a defendant objects to restitution or requests a "full 
hearing" within a reasonable time, there should be no undue delay in the process, no 
imposition of hardship on the victim or parties, and no prejudicial effect upon defendant's 
rights. The provision is not mandatory but directory in terms of timing. When an objection 
or a request for a hearing is made within a reasonable time of the imposition of restitution, 
defendant shall be entitled to a full hearing with due consideration given to the needs of 
multiple actors, to the need to investigate the matter and to present and examine evidence, 
and to the interests of justice. Such an interpretation would be consistent with the statutory 
purpose and due process. 
Finally, whether § 76-3-20 l(4)(e) is construed as provided by the court of appeals or 
otherwise, it plainly does not provide that failure to request the hearing "at the time of 
sentencing" constitutes waiver. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20l(4)(e) (Supp. 1998); 
see also Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e) (illegal sentence may be corrected at any time). That is, the 
statute does not deny the sentencing judge discretion to entertain a request for a restitution 
hearing that is made eleven days after sentencing. 
To that end, assuming arguendo Weeks failed to timely object to restitution, he did 
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not definitively waive his right to a full hearing under the statute. The sentencing judge had 
the discretion to consider the matter on the merits, as he did here. (R. 60.) In this case, the 
judge conducted a hearing, considered argument, and ruled on the matter. (Id.) 
Inasmuch as the trial judge made an erroneous ruling on the merits and would not 
allow Weeks to examine the evidentiary basis for the restitution order, Weeks respectfully 
requests that this Court vacate the trial court's ruling and remand the case to the trial court 
for a full hearing on the matter. 
POINT III. THE COURT OF APPEALS INCORRECTLY RULED THAT 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS NOT REQUIRED TO MAKE CERTAIN 
FINDINGS OF RECORD CONCERNING THE RESTITUTION ORDER. 
Pursuant to Section 76-3-201, the trial court was required to consider certain factors 
in ordering restitution in this case. The statute provides in relevant part the following: 
[(4)(a)](ii) In determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court shall follow 
the criteria and procedures as provided in Subsections (4)(c) and (4)(d). 
* * * 
(4)(c) In determining restitution, the court shall determine complete restitution and 
court-ordered restitution. 
* * * 
[(4)(c)](iii) Complete restitution and court-ordered restitution shall be determined as 
provided in Subsection (8). 
* * * 
[(4)](d)(i) If the court determines that restitution is appropriate or inappropriate under 
this subsection, the court shall make the reasons for the decision apart of the court 
record. 
* * * 
[(8)](c) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for court-ordered 
restitution, the court shall consider the factors listed in Subsection (8)(b) and: 
(i) the financial resources of the defendant and the burden that payment of restitution 
will impose, with regard to the other obligations of the defendant; 
(ii) the ability of the defendant to pay restitution on an installment basis or on other 
conditions to be fixed by the court; 
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(iii) the rehabilitative effect on the defendant of the payment of restitution and the 
method of payment; and 
(iv) other circumstances which the court determines make restitution inappropriate. 
Utah Code Ann. §76-3-201 (Supp. 1998) (emphasis added). 
In considering those provisions as they relate to Board of Pardons proceedings, this 
Court in Monson v. Carver, 928 P.2d at 1017, ruled that the Board "must not only consider 
the four statutory factors when it orders restitution as a condition of parole, but it must also 
comply with the same procedural requirements imposed on a trial court, e.g., it shall make 
a record of the reasons for its decision." IdL at 1028; see also Miller v. State, 932 P.2d 618, 
621 (Utah Ct.App. 1997). 
In State v. Haston, 811 P.2d 929 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), reVd on other grounds, 846 
P.2d 1276(Utah 1993), the court ofappeals ruled that pursuant to Section 76-3-201, the trial 
court "must declare reasons within the statutory framework for awarding or denying 
restitution." Haston, 811 P.2d at 936-37. Because the trial court failed in that case to enter 
findings on the record concerning defendant's financial resources and ability to pay in 
ordering restitution, the court ofappeals had no way to assess compliance with the statute 
and ordered remand for additional proceedings and supplementary findings. Id 
In State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219 (Utah 1997), this Court read the relevant 
statutory provisions set forth above to provide that the trial court must state the reasons for 
restitution on the record in light of the statutory factors. This Court ruled that "before 
ordering restitution, the court must take into account the financial resources of the 
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defendant." 14 at 1233 (citing Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20l(4)(c)(i)).4 "If the court 
determines that restitution is appropriate or inappropriate under this subsection, the court 
shall make the reasons for the decision apart of the court record." Id. at 1234 (emphasis in 
original; citing Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20l(4)(d)(i)). 
We read this requirement to mean that after taking into account the factors listed in 
section 76-3-20 l(4)(c) [now subsection (8)], the trial court must take the additional 
step of explicitly noting on the record the reasons for the decision it reached, 
reflecting the detailed factors listed in the statute. This directive precludes the 
Ramirez assumption. 
In the present case, though the court explained its reasons for imposing 
restitution of State Hospital costs incurred during Robertsons period of malingering, 
the court did not discuss on the record the reasons for ordering restitution of 
extradition costs. Because this error occurred at the sentencing stage, where costs 
were imposed, we vacate the portion of the order imposing extradition costs and 
remand to the trial court for further proceedings in compliance with section 76-3-
201(4)(d)(i). 
Robertson, 932 P.2d at 1234; see supra note 4, herein.5 
4
 Restitution apparently was imposed against Robertson pursuant to the 1994 version of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201. See Robertson, 932 P.2d at 1223 (following a four-day trial in 
1994, Robertson was convicted and trial court imposed restitution). That version of the 
statute listed the factors to be considered in imposing restitution at subsection (4)(c), where 
the court was required to consider the defendant's financial resources and ability to pay. 
In 1995, the legislature moved the list of factors to subsection (8) and revised sub-
section (4). In the current version of the statute, the list of factors is made applicable to the 
court's consideration via subsection (4)(a)(ii), which requires the court to "follow the criteria 
and procedures in Subsections (4)(c) and (4)(d).ff Subsection (4)(c)(iii) in turn provides that 
"complete restitution and court-ordered restitution shall be determined as provided in 
Subsection (8)," and subsection (4)(d)(i) requires the court to "make the reasons for its 
[restitution] decision a part of the court record." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (Supp. 1998). 
5
 The Court described the "Ramirez assumption" as follows: when "factual issues are 
presented to and must be resolved by the trial court but no findings of fact appear in the 
record, we 'assume that the trier of [the] facts found them in accord with its decision, and we 
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In this matter, Weeks argued on appeal that the trial court committed plain error when 
it failed to make findings of record concerning the basis for the restitution amount. 
See Weeks, 2000 UT App 273, <fll5. To establish plain error, an appellant must show that 
11
 (i) [a]n error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the 
error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable 
outcome for the appellant, or phrased differently, our confidence in the verdict is 
undermined.M State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993). 
Weeks argued that an error existed in that the record failed to support compliance with 
the language of the statute. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(4) and (8); State v. Labrum, 
925 P.2d 937,940-41 (Utah 1996) (plain error exists when a trial court fails to comply with 
statutory language); (R. 70 at Tab 2; 60). Because Utah statutory and case law required the 
court to consider the factors in determining restitution, the error was obvious. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-3-201(4) and (8) (Supp. 1998); Robertson, 932 P.2d at 1234; Miller, 932 P.2d at 
621: Dept. Empl. Sec, of Indus. Com'n of Utah v. Ninth Circuit Court in and for Cedar City 
Dept, 718 P.2d 782, 784 (Utah 1986); infra Point III.A. and B. 
With respect to the prejudice analysis, a reasonable likelihood existed that if the trial 
affirm the decision if from the evidence it would be reasonable to find facts to support it." 
Robertson, 932 P.2d at 1224,1234 (citing State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774,787 (Utah 1991)). 
On the other hand, the "Labrum exception" requires explicit findings of record when 
"an ambiguity of the facts makes the assumption unreasonable, [State v. Labrum, 925 P.2d 
937,939-40 (Utah 1996)]," or when a prior case or statute requires findings in order that the 
appellate court can properly perform its review function. Robertson, 932 P.2d at 1234. 
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court had complied with subsection (8)(c), Weeks would not have been ordered to pay 
restitution in the amount imposed by the court, since consideration of the factors would 
support that Weeks had no financial resources or ability to pay. See infra Point III.B. 
The court of appeals rejected Weeks' arguments on two grounds. Weeks. 2000 UT 
App 273,11J16-17. First, it ruled that § 76-3-201 "does not require findings on the record 
concerning each of the factors." Weeks. 2000 UT App 273,1J16. Second, it ruled that the 
trial court nevertheless met the requirements of § 76-3-201 and Robertson, when it stated "on 
the record that restitution was appropriate based on defendant's criminal acts and his criminal 
history." Weeks. 2000 UT App 273,1fl6. The court of appeals1 ruling is in error and in 
conflict with Utah law, as set forth below. 
A. THE COURT OF APPEALS' RULING CONCERNING THE FINDINGS ON 
THE RECORD IS IN CONFLICT WITH THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF SECTION 
76-3-201 AND ROBERTSON. 
As set forth above, this Court has ruled that relevant provisions of Section 76-3-201 
require the trial court to consider specific factors when ordering restitution and to "take the 
additional step of explicitly noting on the record the reasons for the decision it reached, 
reflecting the detailed factors listed in the statute." Robertson. 932 P.2d at 1234. "[I]n 
determining whether or not to order restitution, the court is required to consider the financial 
resources of the defendant and the burden that payment of restitution will impose, the ability 
of the defendant to pay restitution, the rehabilitative effect of the payment of restitution, and 
other relevant circumstances." Dept. of Empl. Sec, of Indus. Com'n of Utah. 718 P.2d at 
784; see also Miller, 932 P.2d at 621 (Board must consider factors); Starnes, 841 P.2d at 715 
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n.3 (court must consider defendant's financial resources in determining restitution); Monson, 
928 P.2d at 1028-29 (remanding the case in order that the Board of Pardons may "comply 
with the statute by giving Monson an explanation of its decision which demonstrates that it 
has taken into account the appropriate statutory factors"). 
In a previous case before this Court, the state recognized the obligation of the trial 
judge to explicitly note on the record the reasons for restitution in light of the factors set forth 
at subsection (8)(c). 
[I]t is not clear that Judge Brian considered required statutory factors in making the 
restitution order. Judge Brian also did not state the reasons for his decision on the 
record as expressly required by statute. Therefore, this issue needs to be remanded 
for Judge Brian to enter findings on the restitution order in light of the required 
statutory factors. 
* * * 
When determining the amount and other conditions for court-ordered restitution, 
section 76-3-20l(8)(c) requires the court to consider 1) the defendant's financial 
resources and the burden that restitution will impose in view of defendant's other 
obligations; 2) the ability of defendant to pay restitution in installments or on other 
conditions fixed by the court; 3) the rehabilitative effect that payment of restitution 
will have on the defendant; 4) other circumstances which the court determines would 
make restitution inappropriate; and 5) applicable criteria under subsection (8)(b) such 
as the amount of the victim's loss. In addition, when determining whether restitution 
is appropriate, "the court shall make the reasons for the decision a part of the court 
record." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20l(4)(d)(i); State v. Robertson. 932 P.2d 1219, 
1233-34 (Utah 1997). This Court has held that under these provisions, once the court 
has taken into account the statutory factors, it must then "take the additional step of 
explicitly noting on the record the reasons for the decision it reached, reflecting the 
detailed factors listed in the statute." Robertson. 932 P.2d at 1234. 
In this case, Judge Brian did not make his reasons for his decision a part of the 
record. It also cannot be determined from the record whether Judge Brian considered 
the required statutory factors in subsection (8)(c). Therefore, this matter should be 
remanded for Judge Brian to enter findings regarding the restitution order in light of 
the statutory factors. 
(State v. GallL Case No. 960018, State's Brief of Appellee, dated June 2, 1997, at 9,45-46; 
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see also 39. Relevant pages from the state's brief in Galli are attached hereto as Addendum 
F. At page 39 of the brief, the state recognized that Gallifs presentence investigation report 
was made part of the record before Judge Brian during sentencing. Apparently, the state in 
Galli did not consider reference to the report without more to be sufficient to satisfy the 
factors set forth at Section 76-3-20 l(8)(c)).) 
The trial court must be held to specifically noting on the record its consideration of 
the statutory factors in ordering restitution. Otherwise, the statutory factors will evade 
appellate review and become irrelevant. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1234; see also State v. Nelson, 
725 P.2d 1353, 1355 n.3 (Utah 1986) (where statute required trial court to consider factors, 
this Court required trial court to enter findings on the record to ensure compliance with 
statutory factors); State in the Interest of ClatterbucL 700 P.2d 1076, 1081 (Utah 1985) 
(same); State v. Galli, 967 P.2d 930, 938 (Utah 1998) (where statute required trial court to 
consider factors, this Court refused to assume compliance where trial court failed to give 
adequate weight to information in the record in light of statutory considerations). 
Here, the court of appeals determined the statute does not "require findings on the 
record concerning each of the factors." Weeks, 2000 UT App 273, TJ16.6 The court of 
appeals erred in its ruling. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(3) (1990) [now § 76-3-201(4)], expressly requires the 
trial court to make its reasons for granting restitution a part of the record. The statute 
further requires that the trial court consider the defendant's financial resources and the 
6
 In its decision, the court of appeals incorrectly cited to subsection (8)(b). The factors 
at issue on appeal were listed at subsection (8)(c). 
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rehabilitative effect of the restitution when determining whether to award restitution. 
Corresponding findings should therefore be made on remand. State v. Haston, 811 
P.2d 929, 936 (Utah App. 1991) (findings should follow the statutory framework). 
Starnes. 841 P.2d at 715 n. 3. Inasmuch as the trial court in this case failed to make a record 
of its reasons for restitution in light of the statutory factors, it failed to comply with statutory 
and case law on the matter. The error was plain and obvious. The court of appeals1 ruling 
should be reversed. 
B. CONTRARY TO THE COURT OF APPEALS1 RULING, THE TRIAL COURT 
DID NOT TAKE THE RELEVANT FACTORS INTO CONSIDERATION IN 
ORDERING RESTITUTION IN THIS CASE. 
Weeks maintains that in order to comply with the statutory criteria and procedures, 
see Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (4)(a)(ii) (referencing (4)(c) (referencing (8))), the trial court 
was required to "take the additional step of explicitly noting on the record the reasons for the 
decision it reached, reflecting the detailed factors listed in the statute/' including defendant's 
financial resources and ability to pay. Robertson, 932 P.2d at 1233-34. 
The court of appeals disagreed. It ruled that the trial court complied with the statutory 
requirements when it made reference to "defendant's criminal acts and his criminal history" 
and "relied on defendant's presentence report in determining restitution." Weeks. 2000 UT 
App 273, ffi[16-17. Those considerations were insufficient in this case and under Utah 
statutory and case law. 
Specifically, in considering the record in this matter, it is unclear how "defendant's 
criminal acts and his criminal history" related to imposition of restitution. The trial court's 
references to those matters occurred as follows: 
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THE COURT: There you have it, Mr. Weeks. There *s no mystery about the fact that 
Vm going to obviously commit you to prison, which is probably where you need to be, 
at least until you get your head on straight. You've taken now since you were 14 to 
develop this style of living, it's going to take you a while [to] undevelop [sic] it. 
There being no legal reason why I should not impose sentence, I will do so at 
this time. Mr. Weeks, it is the judgment and sentence of this court that you serve a 
term provided by law of zero to five years for each of the five separate, excuse me, 
five separate third degree felony charges to which you have plead guilty and that you 
serve a period of one year each on the two separate Class A misdemeanor crimes to 
which you have plead guilty, as has been recommended and simply because of your 
age, Mr. Weeks, everybody's entitled to be stupid, but I think you've been pressing the 
envelope here. 
THE DEFENDANT: I'm (inaudible). 
THE COURT: I will order that your terms imposed by this court will be served 
concurrent and not consecutively. However, they will be consecutive to what you're 
serving at the prison as ordered by Judge Noel. And I will further order that you pay 
restitution in the amount of $9,104.35, that you pay a recoupment fee for the use of 
your publicly provided lawyer of $250, and I will recommend while you're there that 
you receive substance abuse therapy. I will grant you credit, Mr. Weeks, for the time 
you serve in custody awaiting disposition of this charge, except for what you've 
served out there on Noel's terms at the prison. 
(R. 70:Tab 2:9-10 (emphasis added).) 
As reflected in the record, the sentencing judge's references to "defendant's criminal 
acts and his criminal history" related to the fact that the judge intended to send Weeks to 
prison for the crimes. The references do not relate to the restitution ordered in the case. In-
deed, the state admitted in papers filed with the court of appeals that when the trial court 
made reference to Weeks' criminal history, it was "not specifically addressing its reasons for 
restitution." (State's Brief of Appellee, filed May 12, 2000, at pages 8 and 18.) Thus, the 
court of appeals' ruling is in error. See Weeks, 2000 UT App 273, ^[16. 
With respect to the presentence investigation report, the court of appeals ruled that 
because that was "part of the record" and the trial court made reference to the report in 
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imposing restitution, "we can reasonably assume that the court" made the requisite statutory 
findings for restitution. Weeks, 2000 UT App 273, ^[17. The court of appeals relied on 
Robertson to support such an assumption. That case is distinguishable. 
In Robertson, this Court considered two separate restitution awards. Robertson, 932 
P.2d at 1233. Robertson was ordered to pay restitution for costs incurred in connection with 
a State Hospital competency examination and for extradition. Id. 
With respect to the hospital costs, this Court recognized they were incurred pursuant 
to statutory law, which made defendant responsible to the hospital for such costs "if he 
requested a competency exam." Id at 1233 n.8. Thus, since Robertson requested the 
competency examination, he would be liable under statutory law for the costs. 
In addition, in considering the hospital costs, this Court found that "the [trial] court 
explained" on the record its reasons for imposing "restitution of State Hospital costs incurred 
during Robertson's period of malingering." Id. at 1234. Specifically, the trial court 
considered information set forth in the presentence investigation report and evidence in the 
record that defendant had the ability to pay the costs incurred by the State Hospital, where 
the record supported that defendant held jobs before incarceration and was "employed at the 
State Hospital coffee shop during his pretrial incarceration." Id. 
With respect to the extradition costs in Robertson, this Court did not consider a review 
of the report to be sufficient to satisfy consideration of the statutory factors on the record. 
In addition, the Court refused to assume compliance with the statute. Rather, this Court 
vacated that portion of the restitution order and remanded the matter to the trial court "for 
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further proceedings in compliance with section 76-3-201(4)(d)(i)." Robertson, 932 P.2d at 
1234. "We read [the section 76-3-20l(4)(d)(i)] requirement to mean that after taking into 
account the factors listed in section 76-3-20 l(4)(c), the trial court must take the additional 
step of explicitly noting on the record the reasons for the decision it reached, reflecting the 
detailed factors listed in the statute. This directive precludes the use of the Ramirez 
assumption" Id. at 1234; see supra note 5. 
As with the extradition costs in Robertson, the trial court's review of the report in 
Weeks' case cannot satisfy consideration of the statutory factors on the record. Here, there 
is no indication from the record that in ordering restitution, the trial judge considered Weeks' 
financial resources, the burden that payment of restitution would impose on Weeks with 
regard to other obligations, and Weeks' ability to pay. (See R. 60; 70 at Tab 2); see GalH, 
967 P.2d at 938 (trial court did not give adequate weight to facts in light of statutory factors, 
thereby requiring reversal). While subsection (8)(c) provides that the court "shall consider" 
the factors listed in that provision, the silent record in this case does not support that the court 
gave any thought to the matter. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20 l(4)(a)(ii), (4)(c)(iii), (4)(d)(i), 
and (8)(c). 
Indeed, if the trial court had considered the presentence report in reviewing the 
statutory factors, the court would have discovered no financial resources or ability to pay. 
In that regard, the trial court likely would not have ordered restitution or would have ordered 
it in a lesser amount. 
Specifically, the report reflects that Weeks was financially destitute. He was 20 years 
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old at the time of sentencing and incarceration. ("Presentence Investigation Addendum11 at 
1.) He had no financial resources and no assets. (Id.at 13.) Weeks' job history reflected 
that he was last employed two years earlier in 1997 as a "prep cook" making $5.50 an hour. 
(Attachment to "Presentence Investigation Addendum1' at 16.) Also, the attachment to the 
report indicated that Weeks may have been assessed restitution in a previous criminal matter 
in the amount of $3,732. (See Attachment to "Presentence Investigation Addendum" at 8.) 
The earlier restitution award would be a limiting factor on Weeks' ability to pay. 
The report reflected that since Weeks was a juvenile, he held five separate jobs for 
only a few months before he was fired or quit. Also, Weeks was "kicked out" of his parents' 
home at age 13, and he believed the "highest grade he actually completed was the eighth." 
(Attachment to "Presentence Investigation Addendum" at 9-11, 13-17.) 
Because the trial judge here made no reference to the presentence investigation report 
as it related to Weeks' financial resources or ability to pay, and because the presentence 
investigation report does not support Weeks' ability to pay, there is no basis for assuming 
compliance with the statutory factors. See Robertson, 932 P.2d at 1224-25 (there is no basis 
to assume compliance with the statute if there are ambiguities in the facts and/or the law 
requires compliance on the record with the statute); GallL 967 P.2d at 938 (record supports 
that trial court did not give adequate weight to statutory factors, thereby requiring reversal). 
Under the court of appeals' analysis, the trial court's purported consideration of the 
statutory factors in Weeks' case escapes appellate review. See Nelson, 725 P.2d at 1356 n.3 
(where statute required trial court to consider factors, this Court required trial court to enter 
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findings on the record to ensure compliance with statute); Clatterbuck. 700 P.2d at 1081. 
The court of appeals' ruling is in error. Weeks' respectfully requests that this Court 
reverse the court of appeals' ruling and remand the case to the trial court for consideration 
of the factors on the record pursuant to the statute. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, Weeks respectfully requests that this Court reverse 
the court of appeals' ruling in the matter, vacate the trial court's order of restitution, and 
remand this case for a full hearing and proper findings. 
SUBMITTED this ^ a y of _ _ J ^ W , 2001. 
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Attorneys for Defendant 
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publication in the Pacific Reporter 
DAVIS, Judge: 
11 Appellant Lance Michael Weeks appeals the trial 
court's denial of his post-judgment Motion For 
Review Hearing m which he requested a resntunon 
hearing. We affirm. 
I. BACKGROUND 
12 Defendant pleaded guilty on July 6,1999 to seven 
charges arising out of several incidents including high 
speed chases from the police, stealing cars, and 
possessing methamphetamine. As part of a plea 
bargain, the State dismissed several counts and 
defendant agreed to plead guilty to lesser charges. No 
promise was made as to defendant's prison nme, but 
the State made clear that ;t would request consecutive 
terms. No mennon was made of restitution during the 
plea colloquy 
^3 On September 10,1999, defendant was sentenced 
to zero-to- five-years for each offense to be served 
concurrently. The judge -further orderfed] that 
[defendant] pay resntunon in the amount of 
$9,104.35, [ana] that [defendant] pay a recoupment 
fee for the use of [defendant's] publicly provided 
lawyer of S250 " It is clear that defendant read 
the presentence report which set oui the amount of 
damages caused by mm; r.owever, none of the parties, 
including defendant, discussed or objected to the 
resntunon order aunng sentencing. 
14 Eleven aa»s after sentencing, defendant filed a 
Motion For Review Hearing 'n which ne reauested 
that the court scnedule 'a Resntunon [sic] hearing on 
the grounds that defendant objects to the amount of 
resntunon claimed oy \he Stare.' On October ! 8, 
1999, the review hearing < which the court called a 
"hearing incident to the defense monon for review to 
determine appropnate resntunon'*) was held. At that 
hearing, defendant's counsel stated that "there are 
amounts that were being requested that weren't 
supported by evidence in terms of damage, and that 
supposedly there was some victim reparation amount 
that . . . [wasn't] legally applicable." The defense 
attorney continued "I don't see those in the 
presentence report I don't know if your Honor had an 
amount that you came up with at sentencing because 
my files don't reflect the resntunon." The court 
replied by referencing amounts listed in the 
presentence report1 The defense attorney requested 
further documentanon as to the factual basis and 
support for those amounts. 
J5 The court then stated: 
Given the circumstances, the time of the 
sentencing, the persuasive burden is upon the 
State to establish, I believe, by preponderance 
of the evidence to myself, the fact finder, that 
the sums sought for resntunon are fair and 
reasonable. Given what I have reviewed, that 
being the presentence report,^ ] as well as the 
orders m the matter, as well as now having 
heard arguments of counsel, I was persuaded 
and now [am] persuaded that preponderance 
of the evidence burden has been met, that the 
number I have ordered as resntunon is fair 
and reasonable. Consequently the monon to 
modify the-I will characterize it as a monon 
to modify the order of resntunon is denied. 
The order denying defendant's monon was entered on 
October 23, 1999, and defendant appeals. 
II. ANALYSIS 
16 Defendant makes three arguments: (1) he was 
entitled to a full resntunon hearing; (2) the trial court 
failed to make adequate findings pursuant to the 
statutory factors when it ordered resntunon; and (3) 
there was plain error in the manner m which 
resntudon was ordered. 
17 An appellate court will not disturb a trial court's 
resnrution order ''unless it exceeds that prescribed by 
law or otherwise abused its discrenon." State v. 
Schweitzer, 943 P 2d 649, 653 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
It is within the discrenon of the tnai court to impose 
sentence, which may include a fine, restitunon, 
probation or imprisonment See Utah Code Ann. § 
76- 3-201(2) SL (4) (1999); State v Snyder•, ^47 P.2d 
417,420 (Utah 1987). "However, upon convicnon of 
a crime which has resulted in pecuniary damages, :n 
addition to any other sentence imposed, the trial court 
is statutorily mandated to order the payment of 
resntunon unless the court finds that restitution is 
inappropriate." Snyder, 747 P.2d at 420; see also 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(4) (1999). 
18 Under both the United States and the Utah State 
Consntunons, due process requires criminal 
proceedings including sentencing to be based upon 
accurate and rcasonaoly reliable .nformanon. See 
Statev Gomez, SS7° :d~353. 354 (U:ah i994) Thus, 
"[fundamental onnciples of orocedurai fairness *n 
sentencing reouire that a defendant na\e "he ngnt to 
examine and challenge :he«ccurac\ and renaci I it\ oi 
the factual nforrnation ^Don 'vh:ch his e^ *ence s 
based." Id at S55 Howc.er, procedural fairness n 
sentencing 's satisfied when '[defendant had a full 
opportune *o examine ana challenge ~I "acr-ai 
information apon wn*cn rhe court based his 
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sentence." Id. 
19 It is proper for the trial coun to impose restitution 
at sentencing unless defendant objects to its 
imposition and requests a full hearing on the amount 
at that time. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20l(4)(e) 
(1999); State v. Stayer, 706 ?.2d 611,612 (Utah Ct 
App. 1985) (per curiam). In this regard, Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-3-201 (4)(e) (1999) states: "If the defendant 
objects to the imposition, amount, or distribution of 
the restitution, the coun shall at the time of 
sentencing allow the defendant a fuil hearing on the 
issue/ Id. (emphasis added). Thus, the statute is 
clear—any request for a full restitution hearing must 
be made at or before sentencing. Cf. Monson v. 
Carver, 928 P.2d 1017, 1029 (Utah 1996) (holding 
no restitution hearing is mandated when defendant 
did not object to order of restitution or request a 
hearing.); State v. Haga, 954 P.2d 1284, 1289 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1998) (holding defendant entitled to full 
restitution hearing where he requested it at 
sentencing). 
J10 Defendant did not object, question, or even 
mention restitution at sentencing. It is clear from the 
record that defendant closely read the presentence 
report which contained the recommended restitunon 
amount, which is the exact amount that the judge 
adopted when ordering restitution. Thus, prior to 
sentencing, defendant was well aware of the 
recommended restitution amount. Nothing in the 
record suggests that he lacked the opportunity to 
object or request a hearing before, during, or after the 
court imposed that amount.3 Thus, because defendant 
did not request a full restitution hearing at or before 
sentencing and had no good cause not to make the 
request, he waived his entitlement to a restitution 
hearing. See Utah R. Cnm. P. 12(d).4 
^11 Defendant argues that the trial court, in effect, 
waived his waiver because he asserts the hearing on 
his motion after sentencing amounted to a restitution 
hearing. In support of his position defendant cites to 
the following cases: State v. Seale, 853 P.2d 862,870 
(Utah 1993) (concluding when issue raised in motion 
for new trial for first time, and coun addressed issue 
on merits in denying motion and considered alleged 
error rather than finding it waived, defendant's right 
to assert issue on appeal was resuscitated); State v. 
Belgard, 830 P.2d 264, 266 (Utah 1992) (holding 
when defendant waived objection to introduction of 
evidence but evidentiary hearing granted and juage 
considered claim, defendant's waiver was effectively 
waived by judge); State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150, 
1161 (Utah 1991) (concluding when trial court 
addressed issue fully and did not rely on waiver, issue 
will be considered on appeal); State v. Matsamas, 808 
P.2d 1048, 1053 (Utah 1991) (same); State v. 
Dominguez, 1999 UT App 343 ,«5, 992 P.2d 995 
(holding defendant may appeal order stemming from 
full restitution heanng, even though motion for 
hearing filed ten days after sentencing); State v. 
Parker, 872 P.2d 1041, 1044 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) 
(holding "tnai court acted on the merits of motion and 
thus de facto considered ir tirneiy"). 
112 However, these cases are ail disnnguishable 
from this case. In this case, '*[t]he rnai court did not 
take evidence or hold an evidentiary hearing on the 
issue, but instead simply denied the Motion to Alter 
or Amend," and, thereby, did not waive defendant's 
earlier waiver of the heanng. Estate of Covington v. 
Josephson, 888 P.2d 675, 678 n.5 (Utah CL App. 
1994). Here, notwithstanding the trial court's 
mischaractenzation of the hearing in its order, the 
court did not hold an evidentiary hearing on the 
restitution amount, or reconsider the restitution 
amount. Instead, the court merely clarified that the 
restitution amount ordered was based upon the 
presentence report. No further inquiry into the 
restitution amount was made, no evidence was taken, 
and the court did not address the issue on die merits.3 
Thus, because die court did not conduct an 
evidentiary hearing or even reconsider the restitution 
amount on the merits, there was no resuscitation of 
defendant's earlier waiver.6 
113 Defendant next argues that the trial court did 
not make the appropriate findings when ordering 
restitution. As for findings concerning restitution, 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20l(8)(b) (1999) states: "In 
determining the monetary sum and other conditions 
for complete restitution, the coun shall consider all 
relevant facts, including: (i) the cost of the damage or 
loss if the offense resulted in damage to or loss or 
destruction of property of a vicnm of the offense. " In 
addinon, the coun shall consider the financial 
resources of the defendant, his ability to pay 
restitution, and the means by which he can pay. See 
id. §76-3-20 l(8)(c). 
114 However, defendant never challenged the 
restitution award, or the basis of the award during 
sentencing, and he did not allege unusual 
circumstances justifying his failure to do so. "If the 
trial court, as defendant alleges, enoneously failed to 
consider defendant's paltry financial resources before 
ordering [restitution], defendant should have 
immediately brought that error to the attention of the 
sentencing judge. If defendant was denied relief at 
that time, he could have taken direct appeal." James 
v. Galetka, 965 P.2d 567, 574 (Utah Ct App. 1998) 
(emphasis added), cert, denied sub. nom., James v. 
Warden, 982 P.2d 88 (Utah 1999). In addition, "there 
is ample record evidence, from which the trial court 
could have found that restitution was proper." State v. 
Stayer, 706 P.2d 611, 614 (Utah 1985) (per curiam). 
115 Defendants final argument is that it was plain 
error for the trial coun to fail to consider die statutory 
factors when restitutior. was ordered. Because the trial 
court was given the opportunity to correct the alleged 
error m the context of defendant's motion, we will 
address the issue on appeal. 
^16 There was no reversible error here. Utah Zode 
Ann. § 76-3- 201(8)(b) (1999) does not require 
findings on die record concerning each of the factors. 
Unlike statutes that require findings on die record, 
section 76-3-201 (8)(b) merely lists the factors which 
must be considered, and contains no such 
requirement. Instead, Utah Code Ann. 
§76-3-20 l(4)(d)(i) (1999) states: "If the court 
determines that restitution is appropriate or 
inappropriate under this subsection, the court shall 
make the reasons for the decision a part of the court 
record." Here, die trial court stated on die record that 
resntution was appropriate based on defendant's 
criminal acts and his criminal history. 
117 Furthermore, die trial court relied on 
defendant's presentence report in determining 
restitunon. As in State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219 
(Utah 1997), "[pjnor to the imposition of restitution 
costs at the sentencing heanng, the trial court 
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argued that amounts ordered for restitution lacked 
evidentiary support and requested documentation for 
die damages and a hearing. The State argued that the 
amounts were reflected in the presentence 
investigation report and that the amounts, though 
estimates, were reasonable. The trial court ruled from 
the bench: 
Given the circumstances, the time of the 
sentencing, the persuasive burden is upon the 
State to establish, I believe, by preponderance 
of the evidence to myself, the fact finder, that 
the sums sought for restitution are fair and 
reasonable. 
Given what I have reviewed, that being 
the presentence report, as well as the orders in 
the matter, as well as now having heard 
arguments of counsel, I was persuaded and 
[am] now persuaded that preponderance of 
the evidence burden has been met, that the 
numbers I have ordered as restiturion is fair 
and reasonable. Consequendy the motion to 
modify the-I will characterize it as a motion 
to modify the order of restitution is denied. 
On October 28,1999, the court entered an "Order Re: 
Restitution Hearing," which states: 
The Court having heard evidence and 
arguments of counsel, and being otherwise 
fully advised in the premises hereby finds by 
a preponderance of the evidence that the 
original order in the Judgment and 
Commitment in this case is the proper amount 
to be ordered as restitution and hereby 
affirms that order and denies defendant's 
motion. 
(Emphasis added.) 
125 I believe the foregoing establishes the trial 
court did not rely on waiver but instead addressed the 
merits of Defendant's motion objecting to the amount 
of restiturion: Defendant requested a "review 
heaTing,,; the court scheduled a "restitution hearing"; 
the parties argued the validity of the evidentiary basis 
of the restitution award; and the court ruled. 
Defendant argues on appeal that the court erred by 
reconsidering the order of restitution without giving 
Defendant the required evidentiary hearing providing 
an opportunity to present evidence and cross examine 
witnesses. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20 l(4)(e) 
(1999).4 Because the trial court did not provide 
Defendant an evidentiary hearing, I would vacate the 
restitution order and remand for an evidentiary 
hearing on the amount of resntution. 
^26 I also disagree with the majority's conclusion 
that we need not remand for findings related to 
Defendant's ability to pay the restitution assessed. See 
id* The majority cites this court's opinion in State v. 
Galetka, 965 P.2d 567,574 (Utah CL App. 1998), for 
the proposition that remand is not required. Galetka 
is clearly distinguishable in that it involved a petition 
for writ of habeas corpus filed three yean after the 
defendant's conviction, see id. at 569, and the 
defendant neither challenged the resntution dunng 
sentencing nor appealed it. See id. at 574. Galetka 
was decided under the well-established rule that 
courts will not consider an issue on a petition for writ 
of habeas corpus that could have been addressed at 
tnal or on direct appeal. See id. (citing Codianna v. 
Moms, 660 P.2d 1101, 1104 (Utah 1983)). Dicta in 
Galetka concerning the timing requirement of an 
objection to restitution is neither binding nor, in my 
opinion, persuasive. 
K27 Additionally, the majority quotes selectively 
from State v. Stayer, 706 P.2d 611 (Utah 1985), for 
the proposition that we may assume the trial court 
considered all appropriate factors if evidence in the 
record supports the trial courts conclusion. However, 
the full quote from Stayer reads: 
In the case before us, there is ample record 
evidence, from which the trial court could 
have found that restitution was proper. 
Notwithstanding the mandate of the statute 
that the trial court's reasons be included as 
part of its order, we believe that the failure to 
do so in this case was harmless error. 
Nonetheless, we draw attention to this 
requirement for future guidance of the 
sentencing courts. 
Id. at 614 (emphasis added). 
«|28 Subsequent cases from our supreme court 
make clear that record findings under section 
76-3-201 are mandatory so that we may no longer 
assume that the trial court considered the enumerated 
factors. See State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219, 1234 
(Utah 1997) (holding section 76-3-201 is exception to 
general rule that appellate courts "upholdQ the trial 
court even if it failed to make findings on the record 
whenever it would be reasonable to assume that the 
court actually made such findings"); Monson v. 
Carver, 928 P.2d 1017, 1028-29 (Utah 1996) 
(remanding for explanation of statutory factors in 
resntunon order although defendant did not object to 
order). 
129 Accordingly, although the trial court 
discussed some of the statutory factors on the record, 
the court did not explain on the record its evaluation 
of Defendant's ability to pay. Under Robertson and 
Monson, we cannot assume, as the majority does, that 
the trial court considered factors it did not discuss on 
the record. 
f 30 Finally, 1 wish to clarify potentially confusing 
dicta in footnote three of the majority opinion. That 
section of the majority opinion purports to address 
whether the trial court committed plain error by not 
granting an evidentiary hearing. Defendant's actual 
argument, and the issue the majority actually 
addresses, is whether the trial court committed plain 
error by not considering the statutorily mandated 
factors when evaluating restitution. Although I agree 
that remand for an evidentiary hearing for the latter 
would not be required, see Monson,92% P.2d at 1028 
(Utah 1996),5 remand for an evidentiary hearing is 
clearly the remedy if the error was in failing to hold 
a requested evidentiary hearing. See State v. Haga, 
954 P.2d 1284, 1289 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). 
131 For the foregoing reasons, I dissent from the 
majority opinion. 
Judith iVf. Billings, Judge 
1. The State concedes that, had Defendant presented his 
objection requesting an evidentiary hearing at his original 
sentencing hearing, the resntution hearing could not have 
taken place immediately because witnesses would have to 
have been subpoenaed, evidence gathered, and arguments 
prepared. 
2. Indeed, if the court thinks the statute is concerned 
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considered the information set forth in the 
presentence report" Id. at 1234; see also State v. 
Gomez, 887 P.2d 853, S55 (Utah 1994) ("A copy of 
die presentence investigation report was provided to 
defendant prior to [sentencing]. Defendant had the 
opportunity to examine the report and challenge its 
contents and recommendations,"). In Robertson, the 
supreme court also considered that the trial court 
"declined to impose any fine." Robertson, 932 P.2d at 
1234. The Robertson court stated, "[although the 
court did not make findings relating to [defendant's] 
financial condition part of the record, we can 
reasonably assume that the court actually made such 
findings." Id at 1235.7 Here, the presentence report 
was a part of the record and at the hearing on 
defendant's waiver, the thai court stated that it relied 
on the report to determine the amount of restitution. 
Finally, the trial court did not impose a fine; 
therefore, based on the record, "we can reasonably 
assume that the court made such findings." Id.* 
CONCLUSION 
%l& By not objecting to the restitution amount and 
requesting a hearing thereon at or prior to sentencing, 
defendant waived his right to a full restitution 
hearing, and the trial court properly denied his 
motion. Furthermore, in accordance with the effect of 
Robertson, the record allows us to assume the court 
made appropriate findings relative to defendant's 
financial condition. 
James Z. Davis, Judge 
t l 9 I CONCUR: 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Presiding Judge 
1. The presentence report listed under wresutuhon,, the 
specific amounts of damage and stated that the source of 
information was the prosecutor's records, the three victims, 
and Liberty Mutual Insurance. 
2» The presentence report also lists defendant's prior 
employment, the last being a S5.50/hour job which ended 
in June 1997. As for his financial situation, the report states 
that defendant has been incarcerated "[ajnd therefore, has 
no income and no expenses . . . he has no debts and no 
assets, either." 
3. Defendant was not deprived of the opportunity to cross 
examine witnesses or have a restitution hearing; instead, he 
waived that opportunity. 
4- The dissent suggests that timely objection to proposed 
restitution and a request for a full hearing thereon is not as 
significant as timeliness in other areas, thereby leaving the 
time within which a restitution heanng could be requested 
apparently open-ended. 
5. As in Covington, argument in support of defendant's 
motion necessarily addressing the merits thereof, should not 
be confused with an evidentiary heanng. See Estate of 
Covington v. Josephson. 388 P.2d 675, 678 n.5 (Utah Ct 
App. 1994). 
6. The fact that the court did not specifically rely on waiver 
as the basis for denial oi defendant's monon is of no 
consequence because we may affirm the trial court's ruling 
"if it is sustamaoie on any iegai ground . . . even [if 
different] from :hat stated jy :fte aiai court.'' Limb v. 
Federaiea Milk Producers Ass «, 22 Utah 2d 222,461 ?.2d 
290, 293 n.2i 1969). 
7. The Robertson court so heid, notwithstanding language 
therein, apparently confusing :he mandate ot Utah Coae 
Ann. § 76-3- 201(4)(d)(i> \ 1997) with the provisions of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3- :0WS)(bj(i997). 
8. Even if we were to conclude error existed, the remedy 
would not be a restitution hearing as defendant suggests. 
When a record has not been made concerning the reason for 
the amount of restitution, the appropriate remedy "is not to 
vacate the order of restitution" but to order *he trial court to 
comply with the statute by giving "an expiananon of its 
decision which demonstrates that it has taken into account 
the appropriate statutory factors." Monson v. Carver, 928 
P.2d 1017,1028 (Utah 1996). 
BILLINGS, Judge (dissenting): 
120 1 respectfully dissent from the majority 
opinion. 
121 First, I disagree that Utah Code Ann. 
§76-3-201(4) requires a defendant to raise an 
objection at the sentencing hearing. T h e purpose of 
requiring a properly presented objection is to 'putQ 
the judge on notice of the asserted error and allowQ 
the opportunity for correction at that time in the 
course of the proceeding.'" State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 
358,359 (Utah Ct App. 1993) (alteration in original) 
(quoting Broberg v. Hess, 782 P.2d 198, 201 (Utah 
Ct App. 1989)). This policy is a general corollary of 
our refusal to entertain an issue for the first time on 
appeal. The timeliness requirement of this doctrine 
prevents undue delay in litigation. Accordingly, 
objection to hearsay evidence, for example, must be 
made at the time die evidence is proffered; otherwise, 
the objection is waived. 
122 The policy behind the timeliness requirement 
is less significant when, as here, an objection 
necessitates a separate evidentiary heanng.l Inasmuch 
as no objection could be raised until after imposition 
of restitution, I see no praencal difference between an 
objection raised at the sentencing hearing and an 
objection raised eleven days later-well before the 
time for direct appeal has run. 
^23 I read the statute not as emphasizing judicial 
economy but as emphasizing due process concerns.2 
This is of particular concern in this case. Restitution 
was ordered on the basis of damage amounts found in 
Defendant's presentence investigation report.3 
Restitution was thus based on undocumented double 
hearsay proffered by the victims, and Defendant was 
deprived of the opportunity to cross examine the 
victims as to either the identity or valuation of the 
items stolen or the reasonableness of the repair costs. 
124 Even if section 76-3-201 (4)(e) requires that 
an objection be raised at sentencing, I would hold that 
the trial court waived any objection to the timeliness 
of Defendant's motion. The record reveals the 
following sequence of events. The trial court 
sentenced and imposed restitution on Defendant on 
September 10,1999. On September 21,1999, eleven 
days later, Defendant filed in the District Court the 
following "Monon for Review Heanng": 
COMES NOW the Defendant, LANCER 
MICHEL WEEKS [sic], bv and through his 
counsel of record. MATTHEW G. NIELSEN, 
hereby requests pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§76-3-201(4He) (1998), this Court to 
schedule a Resntution heanng on the grounds 
that defendant objects :o :he amount of 
resntution claimed by the State. 
On September 30. 1999, the mal court issued a 
"Notice of Restitution Heanng,' ana that heanng was 
heid on October 13. i 999. At the neanne, Defendant 
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primarily with the timing of an objection, it should require 
that the objection be lodged a reasonable time befort the 
sentencing hearing so that the trial court may "at the Htm of 
sentencing allow the defendant a full hearing on the 
[restitution] issue." Utah Code Arm. $ 76~3-20](4Xc) 
(1999)(emphasis added). This is clearly not what the statute 
requires. 
3. One victim was awarded restitution of S500 for 
unspecified personal property stolen from a victim's car. 
Another victim was awarded restitution of SI500 for a 
stolen radio, damage to the radio wiring, unspecified stolen 
personal, property, and scratches and dents to the car, 
although repairs had not been effected and die amounts 
were catenated by the victim. 
4. Section 76-3-20l(4Xe) provides: "If the Defendant 
objects to the imposition, amount, or distribution of the 
restitution, the court shall at the time of sentencing allow 
die defendant a full hearing on the issue." 
5. The Monson court remanded the matter to the Board of 
Pardons and Parole with instructions "to comply with die 
[restitution] statute by giving [defendant] an explanation of 
its decision which demonstrates that it has taken into 
account the appropriate statutory factors." Monson, 928 
P.2d at 1028. The court did not remand for an evidentiary 
hearing because it held that Monson had not requited a 
hearing from the board, but only made that request in a 
subsequent habeas corpus petition to the district court See 
id. at 1029. 
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ADDENDUM C 
76-3-201. Sentences or combination of sentences allowed 
— Civil penalties — Restitution — Hearing — 
Definitions* 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Conviction" includes a: 
(i) judgment of guilt; and 
(ii) plea of guilty. 
(b) "Criminal activities" means any offense of which the defendant is 
convicted or any other criminal conduct for which the defendant admits 
responsibility to the sentencing court with or without an admission of 
committing the criminal conduct. 
(c) "Pecuniary damages" means all special damages, but not general 
damages, which a person could recover against the defendant in a civil 
action arising out of the facts or events constituting the defendant's 
criminal activities and includes the money equivalent of property taken, 
destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, and losses including earnings 
and medical expenses. 
(d) "Restitution" means full, partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary 
damages to a victim, including the accrual of interest from the time of 
sentencing, insured damages, and payment for expenses to a governmen-
tal entity for extradition or transportation and as further defined in 
Subsection (4)(c). 
(e) (i) "Victim" means any person whom the court determines has 
suffered pecuniary damages as a result of the defendant's criminal 
activities. 
(ii) "Victim" does not include any coparticipant in the defendant's 
criminal activities. 
(2) Within the limits prescribed by this chapter, a court may sentence a 
person convicted of an offense to any one of the following sentences or 
combination of them: 
(a) to pay a fine; 
(b) to removal or disqualification from public or private office; 
(c) to probation unless otherwise specifically provided by law; 
(d) to imprisonment; 
(e) to life imprisonment; 
(f) on or after April 27, 1992, to life in prison without parole; or 
(g) to death. 
(3) (a) This chapter does not deprive a court of authority conferred by law 
to: 
(i) forfeit property; 
(ii) dissolve a corporation; 
(hi) suspend or cancel a license; 
(iv) permit removal of a person from office; 
(v) cite for contempt; or 
(vi) impose any other civil penalty, 
(b) A civil penalty may be included in a sentence. 
(4) (a) (i) When a person is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted 
in pecuniary damages, in addition to any other sentence it may 
impose, the court shall order that the defendant make restitution to 
victims of crime as provided in this subsection, or for conduct for 
which the defendant has agreed to make restitution as part of a plea 
agreement. For purposes of restitution, a victim has the meaning as 
defined in Subsection (l)(e). 
(ii) In determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court 
shall follow the criteria and procedures as provided in Subsections 
(4Xc) and (4)(d). 
(hi) If the court finds the defendant owes restitution, the clerk of 
the court shall enter an order of complete restitution as defined in 
Subsection (8Kb) on the civil judgment docket and provide notice of 
the order to the parties. 
(iv) The order is considered a legal judgment enforceable under the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and the person in whose favor the 
restitution order is entered may seek enforcement of the restitution 
order in accordance with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. In 
addition, the Department of Corrections may, on behalf of the person 
in whose favor the restitution order is entered, enforce the restitution 
order as judgment creditor under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(v) If the defendant fails to obey a court order for payment of 
restitution and the victim or department elects to pursue collection of 
the order by civil process, the victim shall be entitled to recover 
reasonable attorneys fees. 
(vi) A judgment ordering restitution constitutes a lien when re-
corded in a judgment docket and shall have the same effect and is 
subject to the same rules as a judgment for money in a civil action. 
Interest shall accrue on the amount ordered from the time of sentenc-
ing. 
(vii) The Department of Corrections shall make rules permitting 
the restitution payments to be credited to principal first and the 
remainder of payments credited to interest in accordance with Title 
63, Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act. 
(b) (i) If a defendant has been extradited to this state under Title 77, 
Chapter 30, Extradition, to resolve pending criminal charges and is 
convicted of criminal activity in the county to which he has been 
returned, the court may, in addition to any other sentence it may 
impose, order that the defendant make restitution for costs expended 
by any governmental entity for the extradition. 
(ii) In determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court 
shall consider the criteria in Subsection (4)(c). 
(c) In determining restitution, the court shall determine complete 
restitution and court-ordered restitution. 
(i) Complete restitution means the restitution necessary to com-
pensate a victim for all losses caused by the defendant. 
(ii) Court-ordered restitution means the restitution the court hav-
ing criminal jurisdiction orders the defendant to pay as a part of the 
criminal sentence at the time of sentencing. 
(iii) Complete restitution and court-ordered restitution shall be 
determined as provided in Subsection (8). 
(d) (i) If the court determines that restitution is appropriate or inap-
propriate under this subsection, the court shall make the reasons for 
the decision a part of the court record. 
(ii) In any civil action brought by a victim to enforce the judgment, 
the defendant shall be entitled to offset any amounts that have been 
paid as part of court-ordered restitution to the victim. 
(iii) A judgment ordering restitution constitutes a Hen when re-
corded in a judgment docket and shall have the same effect and is 
subject to the same rules as a judgment for money in a civil action. 
Interest shall accrue on the amount ordered from the time of sentenc-
ing. 
(iv) The Department of Corrections shall make rules permitting the 
restitution payments to be credited to principal first and the remain-
der of payments credited to mterest in accordance with Title 63, 
Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act. 
(e) If the defendant objects to the imposition, amount, or distribution of 
the restitution, the court shall at the time of sentencing allow the 
defendant a full hearing on the issue. 
(5) (a) In addition to any other sentence the court may impose, the court 
shall order the defendant to pay restitution of governmental transporta-
tion expenses if the defendant was: 
(i) transported pursuant to court order from one county to another 
within the state at governmental expense to resolve pending criminal 
charges; 
(ii) charged with a felony or a class A, B, or C misdemeanor, and 
(iii) convicted of a crime. 
(b) The court may not order the defendant to pay restitution of 
governmental transportation expenses if any of the following apply* 
(i) the defendant is charged with an infraction or on a subsequent 
failure to appear a warrant is issued for an infraction; or 
(ii) the defendant was not transported pursuant to a court order. 
(c) (i) Restitution of governmental transportation expenses under Sub-
section (5)(aXi) shall be calculated according to the following schedule 
(A) $75 for up to 100 miles a defendant is transported; 
(B) S125 for 100 up to 200 miles a defendant is transported; 
and 
(C) $250 for 200 miles or more a defendant is transported, 
(ii) The schedule of restitution under Subsection (5)(c)(i) applies to 
each defendant transported regardless of the number of defendants 
actually transported in a single trip. 
(6) (a) If a statute under which the defendant was convicted mandates that 
one of three stated minimum terms shall be imposed, the court shall order 
imposition of the term of middle seventy unless there are circumstances in 
aggravation or mitigation of the crime 
(b) Prior to or at the time of sentencing, either party may submit a 
statement identifying circumstances m aggravation or mitigation or 
presenting additional facts. If the statement is in writing, it shall be filed 
with the court and served on the opposing party at least four days prior to 
the time set for sentencing. 
(c) In determining whether there are circumstances that justify impo-
sition of the highest or lowest term, the court may consider the record in 
the case, the probation officer's report, other reports, including reports 
received under Section 76-3-404, statements in aggravation or mitigation 
submitted by the prosecution or the defendant, and any further evidence 
introduced at the sentencing hearing. 
(d) The court shall set forth on the record the facts supporting and 
reasons for imposing the upper or lower term. 
(e) The court in determining a just sentence shall consider sentencing 
guidelines regarding aggravation and mitigation promulgated by the 
Commission on Criminal and Juvenile Justice. 
(7) If during the commission of a crime described as child kidnaping, rape of 
a child, object rape of a child, sodomy upon a child, or sexual abuse of a child, 
the defendant causes substantial bodily injury to the child, and if the charge is 
set forth in the information or indictment and admitted by the defendant, or 
found true by a judge or jury at trial, the defendant shall be sentenced to the 
highest minimum term in state prison. This subsection takes precedence over 
any conflicting provision of law. 
(8) (a) For the purpose of determining restitution for an offense, the offense 
shall include any criminal conduct admitted by the defendant to the 
sentencing court or to which the defendant agrees to pay restitution. A 
victim of an offense, that involves as an element a scheme, a conspiracy, or 
a pattern of criminal activity, includes any person directly harmed by the 
defendant's criminal conduct in the course of the scheme, conspiracy, or 
pattern. 
(b) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for complete 
restitution, the court shall consider all relevant facts, including: 
(i) the cost of the damage or loss if the offense resulted in damage 
to or loss or destruction of property of a victim of the offense; 
(ii) the cost of necessary medical and related professional services 
and devices relating to physical, psychiatric, and psychological care, 
including nonmedical care and treatment rendered in accordance with 
a method of healing recognized by the law of the place of treatment; 
the cost of necessary physical and occupational therapy and rehabili-
tation; and the income lost by the victim as a result of the offense if the 
offense resulted in bodily injury to a victim; and 
(iii) the cost of necessary funeral and related services if the offense 
resulted in the death of a victim. 
(c) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for court-
ordered restitution, the court shall consider the factors listed in Subsec-
tion (8Kb) and: 
(i) the financial resources of the defendant and the burden that 
payment of restitution will impose, with regard to the other obliga-
tions of the defendant; 
(ii) the ability of the defendant to pay restitution on an installment 
basis or on other conditions to be fixed by the court; 
(iii) the rehabilitative effect on the defendant of the payment of 
restitution and the method of payment; and 
(iv) other circumstances which the court determines make restitu-
tion inappropriate. 
(d) The court may decline to make an order or may defer entering an 
order of restitution if the court determines that the complication and 
prolongation of the sentencing process, as a result of considering an order 
of restitution under this subsection, substantially outweighs the need to 
provide restitution to the victim. 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process 
of law. 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
AMENDMENT XIV 
Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal 
protection.] 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
Sec* 2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appoint-
ment] 
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to 
their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each 
State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election 
for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President of the United States, 
Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial Officers of a State, or 
the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabit-
ants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United 
States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other 
crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion 
which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of 
male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State. 
Sec. 3. [Disqualification to hold office.] 
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or Elector of 
President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the 
United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a 
member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of 
any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to 
support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrec-
tion or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies 
thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such 
disability. 
Sec. 4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of the 
Confederacy and claims not to be paid.] 
The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, 
including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in 
suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the 
United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation in-
curred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any 
claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations, 
and claims shall be held illegal and void. 
Sec. 5. [Power to enforce amendment.] 
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the 
provisions of this article. 
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1 I P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 (Electronically recorded on October 18, 1999) 
3 THE COURT: Let's go to the matter of State 
4 I of Utah vs. Lance Michael Weeks. Mr. Bellesandro, 
I 
5 | you're appearing by way of having been drafted by this 
6 Court in this matter, I assume, to some extent, at 
7 least. 
8 MR. MORGAN: Your Honor, I volunteered 
9 instead of Mr. Bellesandro this morning. 
10 [ THE COURT: And we have Mr. Williams here, 
11 as well as Weeks in the holding cell, I believe. 
12 MR. MORGAN: Right, I believe he's in there 
13 talking to his client. 
14 THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Williams, you're 
15 appearing in this matter on behalf of the defendant? 
16 MR. WILLIAMS: I am, your Honor. 
i 
17 THE COURT: And you are Lance Michael Weeks; 
l 
18 is that correct? 
19 MR. WEEKS: Yes, sir. 
2 0 THE COURT: Mr. Williams is still your 
21 lawyer, correct? 
i 
22 ' MR. WEEKS: Yes. 
23 THE COURT: I assume he may be for the rest 
24 of his natural born life. 
25 MR. WEEKS: Just the other day I found out 
3 
my old lawyer isn't going to be a DA, so I guess he's 
my lawyer. 
MR. WILLIAMS: Yeah, I've got this case as a 
reassignment after Matt Nielsen (inaudible) released 
(inaudible). 
THE COURT: I appreciate your clarification. 
Nielsen was the previous lawyer and now you're new. I 
assumed, Mr. Williams, that you were his lawyer during 
the course of the pleadings that were taken back--
MR. WILLIAMS: No, I wasn't. 
THE COURT: It's nice to have you here, and 
Mr. Weeks, that's acceptable with you; is it not, sir? 
MR. WEEKS: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: This matter was set for hearing 
incident to the defense motion for review to determine 
appropriate restitution. Given the fact that Mr. Gill 
is not available, I've asked Mr. Morgan to stand in on 
the matter, and I'll entertain your comments, Mr. 
Williams, at this point in support of the motion that 
you filed. 
MR. WILLIAMS: Let me just note, your Honor, 
for the record again that it was actually the last act 
of Mr. Nielsen before it was transferred (inaudible) . 
THE COURT: What a (inaudible). 
MR. WILLIAMS: I'm in a tough position 
4 
because frankly, the only figure that I have to work 
with is the $9,104.35 figure in the presentence 
report. I talked with Mr. Nielsen today to try to 
understand where we were and to try to inform counsel 
for the State that (inaudible) to stand in on this 
hearing, too. To help everybody understand, he said 
there was some large figure that he quoted that was 
much larger than that, but I don't have any 
understanding right now of what the actual figure is 
to be honest. 
At any rate, that he believes that there are 
amounts that were being requested that weren' t 
supported by evidence in terms of damage, and that 
supposedly there was some victim reparation amount 
that he didn't think were legally applicable. 
I don't see those in the presentence report. 
I don't know if your Honor had an amount that you came 
up with at sentencing because my files don't reflect 
the restitution. 
THE COURT: Well, I can clarify that to some 
extent for you, Mr. Williams. The sentence judgment 
commitment that I entered in this matter ordered 
restitution in the amount of $9,104.35. That number 
is the sum of three separate categories identified in 
the presentence report. 
5 
There were victim impact sums in the amount 
of $1500 each to one, Hatten and one, Garcia for auto 
damages as a result of thefts of this defendant, and 
then the $6104.3 5 to Liberty Mutual Insurance carrier, 
which was the carrier for the Garcia vehicle for 
repairs incident to the conduct of this defendant. 
Now those three sums totaled the $9100 plus 
dollars that I ordered in the way of restitution at 
the time of the sentencing. 
MR. WILLIAMS: I think, your Honor, that the 
question then becomes whether or not --or what was 
the factual basis and the support in terms of 
(inaudible) paperwork for those amounts. When things 
are rounded off amounts of $1500 brings some question 
in my mind just looking at this. 
With the (inaudible) Garcia, which perhaps 
is a deductible is the only thing I would think that 
would explain a rounded off figure like that, that 
doesn't seem to apply to David Hatten. If I could be 
so presumptuous, I guess I would presume that that's 
what was going through Mr. Nielsen's mind and that's 
why he requested a hearing and requested some 
documentation, and that hasn't arrived at this point, 
so I don't know what the State's documentary basis for 
for the State--
6 
MR. MORGAN: Your Honor, I have the 
statements in the report saying that Mr. Hatten lost 
personal items and repairs that totaled $1500, and 
more repair payments from Mr. Garcia would indicate 
that personal items of $500 were missing, a $500 
deductible was paid, and an additional $500 to repair 
and painting of the car to make it match. Those don't 
sound like unreasonable sums, and they sound -- even 
if they are estimates, they're probably only pennies 
off or probably short, so (inaudible) as to this type 
of conduct. 
I'd ask the Court to order that the 
restitution remain based upon the findings of police 
and the presentence report, and that if there are 
further adjustments then the board of pardons might be 
the right place to take care of these matters. 
MR. WILLIAMS: Your Honor, I think that the 
last statement may be accurate and it may be a good 
idea, but I would just submit that it ought to go up 
to them on total determination, if the board of 
pardons determines it, let them determine it all, but 
I don't think if there's a factual basis today in 
response to defendant's motion sufficient for your 
Honor to make the finding (inaudible) restitution 
figures that are there. 
7 
I think the presentence report ought to be 
helpful, especially to the Court and counsel as to 
what it seeks to prove or document evidence that would 
support the figures, but I don't think it's sufficient 
as of today for your Honor to actually enter an order 
(inaudible). 
THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Williams. Given 
the circumstances, the time of the sentencing, the 
persuasive burden is upon the State to establish, I 
believe, by preponderance of the evidence to myself, 
the fact finder, that the sums sought for restitution 
are fair and reasonable. 
Given what I have reviewed, that being the 
presentence report, as well as the orders in the 
matter, as well as now having heard arguments of 
counsel, I was persuaded and now persuaded that 
preponderance of the evidence burden has been met, 
that the numbers I have ordered as restitution is fair 
and reasonable. Consequently the motion to modify 
the -- I will characterize it as a motion to modify 
the order of restitution is denied. 
If you will prepare an appropriate order, 
counsel. Thank you for your efforts, everyone, we'll 
be in recess. 
(Hearing concluded) 
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That the foregoing proceedings were transcribed 
under my direction from the electronic tape recording 
made of these proceedings. 
That this transcript is full, true, and correct 
and contains all of the evidence, all of the 
objections of Counsel and rulings of the Court and all 
matters to which the same relate which were audible 
through said tape recording. 
I further certify that I am not interested in the 
outcome thereof. 
That certain parties were not identified in the 
record, and therefore the name associated with the 
statement may not be the correct name as to the 
speaker. 
WITNESS MY HAND AND SEAL this 29th day of 
November 1999. 
My commission expires: 
February 24, 2 000 
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
LANCE MICHAEL WEEKS, 
Defendant. 
ORDER RE: RESTITUTION HEARING 
Wo:^7, <W>3Hac, a^C^)c 
CaseNo. 9 9 1 9 0 2 8 3 0 ^ 7 / 9 * 3 * ^ " ? ? ' ^ ^ ' 
Hon. Frederick 
This matter came up for hearing regarding defendant's Motion Objecting to the Order of 
Restitution in this case on the 18th day of October, 1999, the defendant being present and 
represented by his counsel, and the state being present and represented by its counsel The Court 
having heard evidence and arguments of counsel, and being otherwise fully advised in the 
premises hereby finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the original order in the Judgment 
and Commitment in this case is the proper amount to be ordered as restitution and hereby affirms 
that order and denies defendant's motion. 
DATED this ^Wday of October, 1999. 
Approved as to form: 
tt Williams 
ORDER RE: RESTITUTION HEARING 
Case No. 991902830 
Page 2 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order Re: Restitution 
Hearing was delivered to Scott Williams, Attorney for Defendant Lance Michael Weeks, at 424 
East 500 South, Suite 300, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 on the $> day of October, 1999. 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
B. KENT MORGAN, 3945 
Deputy District Attorney 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801)363-7900 
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Third Judicial District 
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
LANCE MICHAEL WEEKS, 
Defendant. 
ORDER RE: RESTITUTION HEARING 
woaw, w^Hx, ^ l^3Jr7vf 
Case No. 991902830' <?<?/ 9o1o^j ' 4°i°° 
Hon. Frederick 
This matter came up for hearing regarding defendant's Motion Objecting to the Order of 
Restitution in this case on the 18th day of October, 1999, the defendant being present and 
represented by his counsel, and the state being present and represented by its counsel. The Court 
having heard evidence and arguments of counsel, and being otherwise fully advised in the 
premises hereby finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the original order in the Judgment 
and Commitment in this case is the proper amount to be ordered as restitution and hereby affirms 
that order and denies defendant's motion. 
" AS-DATED this j£#day of October, 1999. 
Approved as to form: 
C-Scttt Williams 
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
LANCE MICHAEL WEEKS, 
Defendant. 
ORDER RE: RESTITUTION HEARING 
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Hon. Fredenck 
This matter came up for hearing regarding defendant's Motion Objecting to the Order of 
Restitution in this case on the 18th day of October, 1999, the defendant being present and 
represented by his counsel, and the state being present and represented by its counsel. The Court 
having heard evidence and arguments of counsel, and being otherwise fully advised in the 
premises hereby finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the original order in the Judgment 
and Commitment in this case is the proper amount to be ordered as restitution and hereby affirms 
that order and denies defendant's motion. 
DATED this ^tifMay of October, 1999. 
Approved as to form: 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order Re: Restitution 
Hearing was delivered to Scott Williams, Attorney for Defendant Lance Michael Weeks, at 424 
East 500 South, Suite 300, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 on the &_ day of October, 1999. 
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holding a full hearing on the restitution issue because defendant objected only to the 
legality of the restitution order and there was no need for an evidentiary hearing on that 
issue. Furthermore, defendant did not request a hearing on the issue. 
However, it is not clear that Judge Brian considered required statutory factors in 
making the restitution order. Judge Brian also did not state the reasons for his decision on 
the record as expressly required by statute. Therefore, this issue needs to be remanded for 
Judge Brian to enter findings on the restitution order in light of the required statutory 
factors. 
Point V: Judges Rigtrup and Iwasaki did not abuse their discretion by imposing 
consecutive prison sentences. The gravity of defendant's crimes and his two flights to 
avoid prosecution justify the consecutive sentences, even though defendant's prior criminal 
record was insignificant and even though he was a model citizen while a fugitive from 
justice. The record also clearly establishes that in imposing the consecutive sentence, 
Judge Rigtrup did not impermissibly consider a homicide for which defendant had not been 
convicted. 
9 
Although the presentence report did not mention defendant's family as victims or 
the $40,000 they had forfeited, it did mention that defendant had absconded from Utah 
after bailing out of jail and that he had been a fugitive for nearly three years (B-PSI at 10). 
The presentence report did not make any recommendations regarding restitution to 
defendant's family. 
On appeal, defendant argues 1) that Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20 l(Supp. 1996), 
Utah's Restitution Statute, does not permit a sentencing court to order restitution for a bond 
forfeiture due to the defendant's flight, 2) that defendant should have been afforded a full 
hearing on the issue so that he could present relevant evidence, and 3) that Judge Brian did 
not consider criteria required by Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20 l(8)(c) (Supp. 1996) (Br. App. 
36-41). 
A. The plain language of Utah Code Ann. 6 76-3-201 allows a sentencing court to require 
a defendant to repay his family for a bond forfeiture resulting from his unlawful flight from 
the jurisdiction. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20l(4)(a)(i) (Supp. 1996) provides 
When a person is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in pecuniary 
damages, in addition to any other sentence it may impose, the court shall order that 
the defendant make restitution to victims of crime as provided in this subsection, or 
for conduct for which the defendant has agreed to make restitution as part of a plea 
agreement. 
The question in this case is whether defendant's flight from the jurisdiction amounted to a 
criminal activity that resulted in pecuniary damages and whether defendant's family could 
be classified as victims under the statute. 
The statute defines "criminal activities" as "any offense of which the defendant is 
convicted or any other criminal conduct for which the defendant admits responsibility to 
39 
Under these circumstances it does not appear that an evidentiary hearing was 
necessary. Therefore, Judge Brian did not err in not providing a full hearing. 
C, This issue should be remanded for Judge Brian to consider the appropriate criteria in 
imposing restitution and to enter written findings. 
Defendant argues that Judge Brian abused his discretion by failing to take into 
account various statutory factors when he imposed the restitution order. 
When determining the amount and other conditions for court-ordered restitution, 
section 76-3-20 l(8)(c) requires the court to consider 1) the defendant's financial resources 
and the burden that restitution will impose in view of defendant's other obligations; 2) the 
ability of defendant to pay restitution in installments or on other conditions fixed by the 
court; 3) the rehabilitative effect that payment of restitution will have on the defendant; 4) 
other circumstances which the court determines would make restitution inappropriate; and 
5) applicable criteria under subsection (8)(b) such as the amount of the victim's loss. In 
addition, when determining whether restitution is appropriate, "the court shall make the 
reasons for the decision a part of the court record." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20 l(4)(d)(i); 
State v. Robertson. 932 P.2d 1219, 1233-34 (Utah 1997). This Court has held that under 
these provisions, once the court has taken into account the statutory factors, it must then 
Code Ann. § 77-18-l(5)(c) (Supp. 1996). He claims that the failure of the presentence 
report in his case to contemplate the restitution order denied him an opportunity to present 
testimony, evidence or other information as he was entitled to under Utah Code Ann. § 
77-18-1(7). Defendant, however, never alleged below or in his opening brief that the 
$40,000 figure is unreliable. He also does not allege what evidence he would have put on 
if given the opportunity (Br. App. 36-39). Therefore, it does not appear that an 
evidentiary hearing was required. 
45 
"take the additional step of explicitly noting on the record the reasons for the decision it 
reached, reflecting the detailed factors listed in the statute." Robertson. 932 P.2d at 1234. 
In this case, Judge Brian did not make his reasons for his decision a part of the 
record. It also cannot be determined from the record whether Judge Brian considered the 
required statutory factors in subsection 8(c). Therefore, this matter should be remanded for 
Judge Brian to enter findings regarding the restitution order in light of the statutory' factors. 
POINT V 
JUDGE IWASAKI AND JUDGE RIGTRUP DID NOT ABUSE 
THEIR DISCRETION IN IMPOSING CONSECUTIVE 
SENTENCES ON DEFENDANT FOR HIS ACTIVE 
PARTICIPATION IN THREE AGGRAVATED ROBBERIES, 
PARTICULARLY IN VIEW OF HIS FLIGHT TO AVOID 
PROSECUTION. 
Defendant asserts that Judge Rigtrup impermissibly based his sentencing decision to 
impose consecutive sentences on a death for which defendant had not been charged or 
convicted (Br. App. 47-50). Defendant also argues that both Judges Iwasaki and Rigtrup 
abused their discretion in imposing consecutive sentences because "they failed to fully 
consider the gravity and circumstances of the offenses and defendant's history, character 
and rehabilitative needs" (Br. App. at 44). 
A- Judge Rigtrup did not base his imposition of a consecutive sentence on a death for 
which defendant was not convicted. 
Judge Rigtrup sentenced defendant to a five-year-to-life term in prison for the Tool 
Shed robbery to run consecutively from defendant's other sentences (R.R. 141,265). In 
considering defendant's sentence, the court considered the seriousness of the crime, the 
fact that defendant had pleaded guilty to three counts of aggravated robbery, defendant's 
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were not required to reward defendant's flight from justice by giving him credit for his 
conduct while a fugitive. To do so would have been a slap in the face to his co-defendants. 
As Judge Rigtrup observed, "Your fugitive status, your failure to be here and face the 
music has set you [apart] from the brother and cousin (R.R. 265)."16 
In sum, under these facts, the consecutive sentences are not so inherently unfair that 
they constitute an abuse of discretion. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing arguments this Court should affirm the denial of defendant's 
motions to suppress and the imposition of consecutive sentences. This Court should also 
hold that Judge Brian could properly order defendant to reimburse him family for the 
forfeiture of their collateral when defendant absconded. It should remand the restitution 
issue, however, for Judge Brian to correct the clerical error in the final judgment 
concerning the restitution order and for Judge Brian to enter findings regarding the 
restitution order in light of the requisite statutory factors. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED t h i s ^ d a y of June, 1997. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
6/LAURAB.DUAPIX 
Assistant Attorney General 
,6Defendant cites to State v. Smith. 909 P.2d 236 (Utah 1995) and State v. Strunk. 
846 P.2d 1297 (Utah 1993) to support his claim that his consecutive sentences are unfair. 
Unlike defendant, however, Strunk was extremely young at the time of his crimes, which 
was a basis for the Court's setting aside the consecutive sentences. IsL at 1301-02. Also, 
unlike Smith, defendant's consecutive sentences do not amount to a minimum-mandatory 
life sentence. Smith. 909 P.2d at 244-45. 
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